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Abstract 
Friedrich Schelling has re-emerged recently in Anglo-Saxon philosophy as a singularly 
important figure in German Idealism, not as some mediate figure in between Kant, 
Fichte, and Hegel. Because Schelling’s works resist being subsumed into a univocal or 
systematic articulation, they instead invite a reading, in the sense developed by Jean-Luc 
Nancy, that itself is transported to the writing of his texts. In order to show the auto-
immune character of Schelling’s writing, this thesis will turn to Schelling’s First Outline 
of a System of the Philosophy of Nature (1799), the Philosophical Investigations into the 
Essence of Human Freedom (1809), and the unfinished The Ages of the World (1815). 
These texts show that the recent resurgence of Schelling in theory and philosophy is not 
because of philosophy’s re-discovery of Schelling, but that Schelling is representative of 
the crisis in which theory and philosophy currently find themselves, articulating a 
deconstructive writing avant-la-lettre. 
Keywords 
Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von, 1775-1854; German Idealism; Deconstruction; 
Writing; Philosophy of Nature; Absolute Idealism; Trauma; Repression; Derrida; Nancy; 
Bataille.  
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The Writing of Nature: Schelling’s First Outline 
1. 1 Introduction 
 
Reading Friedrich Schelling’s First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of 
Nature is rather different than reading works from Schelling’s contemporaries during the 
period of what is now called German Idealism. Schelling may share a historical time and 
space with Kant, Fichte, and Hegel, but his writings were never quite like theirs. Even 
Schelling admits of the First Outline, in terms of the text’s written construction, that the 
“same demands cannot rightfully be made upon a treatise that has been written solely and 
exclusively to serve as a guide for lectures” (Schelling First Outline 3). It is for precisely 
this reason that I have chosen the First Outline as a text through which we enter into the 
more ‘general text’ that is Schelling’s body of work. Under the assemblage of this 
project’s focus on texts ranging from 1795 up to 1815, this chapter seeks to establish the 
First Outline as a first instance of Schelling’s ‘body of work’ as a body that is not whole 
yet still alive. Like Gilles Deleuze’s ‘body without organs,’ Schelling’s texts seek to 
account for themselves in the process of their own writing, and, as a result, are in 
possession of a vitality that cannot be, or resists being, subsumed or absolutized under 
one determinate principle, one body, one organization, one organ. In other words, taking 
up the writing (écriture), in the sense developed by Jacques Derrida, that is specific to 
Schelling as the interpretive point of departure for the First Outline, I argue that the text 
is simultaneously productive and critical of its productivity as it puts under erasure–and 
in some cases undoes–the concepts, ideas, and organizational structures that it lays before 
the reader as ‘finished’ products.  
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 Within the larger context of this thesis, the aim of this chapter is to establish a 
critical reading of Schelling’s philosophical texts from the Philosophical Letters on 
Dogmatism and Criticism up to and including The Ages of the World. This reading, to 
borrow from Jean-Luc Nancy’s reading of Hegel in The Speculative Remark, finds itself 
“transported to the writing” of the text and to “the plasticity of the exposition” (Nancy 
Speculative Remark 13). For reading “is a matter of grasping [empoigner] the proposition 
otherwise–and of grasping the entire philosophical writing by another end, by two ends, 
or still otherwise, who knows?” (Nancy Speculative Remark 12-13). To read Schelling is 
to read a philosophical work from a literary perspective in the sense developed by 
Derrida, in the words of Rodolphe Gasché: “‘Literature’s’ subversion of both philosophy 
and literature, of both truth and the simulacrum . . . proceeds from its status as a between, 
forming a certain corner, a certain angle, with respect to both literature and philosophy” 
(Gasché Tain of the Mirror 260). A reading of this sort is never a clinical operation 
performed on the text, but works from inside the text “otherwise” in order to read closely 
the plasticity of speculative language. This allows for new ways of orienting oneself 
within the text or uncovering how the text re-orients itself. “Because to philosophize 
about nature means as much as to create it,” writes Schelling at the beginning of the First 
Outline (Schelling First Outline 5), so too is the philosophy of nature a creating of nature 
as much as it is a writing of nature whose “analysis can not be permitted to stop at any 
one thing that is a product; it can only cease with the purely productive.” Therefore, one 
is never finished reading, since the text is never finished its writing, which is a writing 
that invites a philosophical reading that is itself infinite. 
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1. 2 The Underwriting of Speculative Philosophy  	  
 The infinite or absolute character of Schelling’s nature as a pure productivity has 
not gone unnoticed. Recently, with the publication of Philosophies of Nature After 
Schelling, Iain Hamilton Grant argues that one of Schelling’s greatest contributions to 
philosophy was his work on Naturphilosophie. For Grant, “metaphysics cannot be 
pursued in isolation from physics” (Grant Philosophies of Nature vii), and it is only after 
Schelling’s Naturphilosophie that one can pursue this path. Amongst others known 
currently as proponents of speculative realism1, Grant’s project seeks to overturn Kant’s 
pre-eminence in philosophy in order to return to and accomplish the “greater project of 
metaphysics”. What Grant has rightfully shown is that Schelling filled in the gap left by 
Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason that excluded nature from the purview of 
philosophical investigation. Appropriating Kant’s method in the Critique of Pure Reason 
and influenced by Fichte’s subjective idealism from the Wissenschaftslehre, Schelling 
takes both these philosophers out of the realm of the subjective and inserts them into the 
realm of the objective by placing transcendental idealism into nature. This procedure, 
according to Grant, does not seek to give an idealistic explanation of nature but a physical 
explanation of idealism. Schelling’s Naturphilosophie is thus taken up as a critique of 
Kantian and Fichtean idealism and the transcendentalist focus upon the unfolding of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Speculative realism gets its name from the event “‘Speculative Realism: A One-Day Workshop’ [that] 
took place on 27 April 2007 at Goldsmiths, University of London, under the auspices of the Centre for the 
Study of Invention and Social Process, co-sponsored by Collapse. Rather than announcing the advent of a 
new theoretical ‘doctrine’ or ‘school’, the event conjoined four ambitious philosophical projects–all of 
which boldly problematize the subjectivistic and anthropocentric foundations of much of ‘continental 
philosophy’ while differing significantly in their respective strategies for superseding them” (Collapse III 
307). The one-day workshop included philosophers Ray Brassier, Quentin Meillassoux, Iain Hamilton 
Grant, and Graham Harman and is featured in Collapse: Philosophical Research and Development Volume 
III, 2007. For more on Speculative Realism, see Brassier’s Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction, 
Meillassoux’s After Finitude: An Essay On The Necessity of Contingency, Grant’s Philosophies of Nature 
After Schelling, and Harman’s Guerilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology and the Carpentry of Things. 
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subjective absolute. According to Grant, Schelling escapes the correlationist paradigm 
imposed by Kant’s prohibition of thinking the thing-in-itself precisely because he turns 
nature into the thing-in-itself, thereby transposing metaphysics to physics, and 
supposedly solves the problem of the divide between subject and object. Therefore, 
“Schelling’s hypothesis is,” according to Grant, “that there is a naturalistic or physicalist 
ground of philosophy”; quoting from Schelling: “For what we want is not that Nature 
should coincide with the laws of our mind by chance . . . but that she herself, necessarily 
and originally, should not only express, but realize, the laws of our mind” (Grant 
Philosophies of Nature 2). In this sense, for Grant the product within nature is always an 
expression or a manifestation of absolute nature, considered as absolute productivity, in 
the same way as the way we think nature is itself established through, and is a part of, 
nature’s dynamically generative project. 
However, Grant’s reading of Schelling limits his importance to the philosophy of 
nature and loses sight of Schelling’s middle work, especially the Philosophical 
Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom and The Ages of the World, which he 
gestures to but does not really investigate. Grant’s oversight arises precisely from reading 
the “prius of thinking . . . [as] necessarily nature” (Grant “Speculative Realism” 342), as 
well as the prius of Schelling’s philosophy as necessarily the philosophy of nature . “[T]o 
consider the naturephilosophy core to Schellingianism, rather than just a phase” (Grant 
Philosophies of Nature 3) is Grant’s solution for rescuing Schelling from his intermediate 
status between Kant, Fichte, and Hegel. But, because Grant homogenizes “nature,” he 
risks turning Schelling into an ‘–ism,’ and therefore stymies any critical appraisal of the 
distinct figurations of nature throughout Schelling’s texts. Grant is correct in pointing out 
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that Schelling remained committed to Naturphilosophie even in the Freedom essay, 
insofar as Schelling argues “that nature must furnish . . . the only possible basis for a 
philosophy of freedom,” and “[e]ven by 1830, with the Introduction to Philosophy . . . 
naturephilosophy remains the ‘substrate of the entire system’ of philosophy (1989a: 55)” 
(Grant Philosophies of Nature 5). In contrast, though Grant is correct in arguing that the 
categorical division of Schelling’s works into discrete phases impairs a reading that seeks 
continuity in his work, so too does Grant’s prioritizing of Naturphilosophie; this locks 
Schelling into one single articulation of his development, which indeed does away with 
reading him in phases, but also misreads Schelling as a dogmatic realist rather than a 
philosopher who tries to think through the problem of correlationism raised by Kant 
before him. As opposed to Grant’s reading, Schelling absolutizes nature, not merely to 
get rid of the gap between subject and object, but in fact as a means to think through the 
divide between real and ideal as the fundamental condition of the process of thought, 
since, as Grant aptly notes, the philosophy of nature “entails that speculation becomes 
necessary, as the only means not of assessing the access that we have, but of the 
production of thought” (Grant “Speculative Realism” 334). 
 Quentin Meillassoux, another speculative realist, provides a more elaborate 
critique of Kantian and Fichtean idealism2 than does Grant, and provides the critique 
around which all speculative realists unite: the critique of correlationism. In After 
Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, Meillassoux’s central critique of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 One must be prudent and add that speculative realism would only be critiquing the early Fichte and not 
the later works of Fichte after the Jena period. Fichte’s Berlin period (1799-1814) was a period of transition 
in comparison to Fichte’s earlier work, changing the primacy of the ich-form of the I as absolute to 
“something absolute prior to and originally independent of the I (Seyn, ‘Being,’ or Gott, ‘God’)” (Žižek 
“Fichte’s Laughter” 124). 
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Kant revolves around Kant’s development of what Meillassoux has called correlationism, 
“the idea according to which we only ever have access to the correlation between 
thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from the other” 
(Meillassoux 5). This term, which refers to Kant’s epistemological framework of the 
subject-object relation is, for Meillassoux as well as for Grant,3 responsible for 
eliminating the possibility of thinking the absolute from any standpoint except that of the 
subject. Meillassoux writes, 
Critical philosophy does not prohibit all relation between thought and the 
absolute. It proscribes any knowledge of the thing-in-itself (any application of the 
categories to the supersensible), but maintains the thinkability of the in-itself. 
According to Kant, we know a priori that the thing-in-itself is non-contradictory 
and that it actually exists. (Meillassoux 35) 
 
This thinkability of the in-itself as the limit to theory and philosophy, argues Meillassoux, 
is due to the restriction imposed upon philosophy, theory, and thought by the fallacy of 
correlationism. The limits of correlationism further stipulate that we cannot know 
anything outside of us except in relation to how we think it; in other words, “this space of 
exteriority is merely the space of what faces us, of what exists only as a correlate of our 
own existence” (Meillassoux 7). Contemporary philosophers, according to Meillassoux, 
have thus forgotten what it means to think the “absolute outside of pre-critical thinkers,” 
that “outside which was not relative to us, and which was given as indifferent to its own 
givenness to be what it is, existing in itself regardless of whether we are thinking of it or 
not” (Meillassoux 7). The goal of speculative realism, then, is to “uncover an absolute 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Although Grant does not use the word “correlationism” in his book, Philosophies of Nature after 
Schelling, he does critique Kant for prohibiting knowledge of the thing-in-itself. Grant thus pits Schelling’s 
works on Naturphilosophie against Kant’s critical philosophy and post-Kantian subjective idealism, but this 
in fact misreads or ignores attempts made by Kant in his Opus Postumum and further Hegel’s work on the 
Philosophy of Nature, as texts that try to conceive of metaphysics according to physics. In reality, Grant is 
at his best when he reads Schelling with the philosophical and scientific evidence which informed his 
writings during the period of Schelling’s naturephilosophy. 
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necessity that does not reinstate any form of absolutely necessary entity” (Meillasoux 34) 
such as God, an absolute organism, phlogiston, etc., all while remaining free of the 
limitations imposed by the correlationist paradigm that would limit philosophy’s ability 
to think the absolute, specifically to think of the absolute as an a-subjective, factical 
principle.  
 But what is it about correlationism that actually limits thought from thinking the 
absolute in terms of facticity or otherwise as the subtitle of After Finitude indicates: 
thinking the absolute in terms of the necessity of contingency? According to Meillassoux, 
there are two kinds of correlationism, one weak and one strong. The weak version is that 
supported by the Kantian critical philosophy as described above, and does not concern 
Schelling as much as it does Kant and Fichte. For weak correlationism provides that the 
thing-in-itself be thought as a “principle [which] require[s] that there be a possible 
explanation for every worldly fact,” (Meillassoux 33) and as a principle that we cannot 
obtain “positive knowledge of . . . through the use of a logical principle alone” 
(Meillassoux 32) or as something that can be intuited in the world. Therefore, Kant’s 
weak correlationism thinks the thing-in-itself, according to Meillassoux, as a priori, non-
contradictory, as causa sui, and as actually existing. The strong version, on the other 
hand, is more relevant to this reading of Schelling seeing that Meillassoux includes 
Schelling’s conception of nature in the list of strong correlationist ideas that must be put 
to the test against the speculative realist project. Firstly, all correlationism posits the 
thesis “of the essential inseparability of the act of thinking from its content. All we ever 
engage with is what is given-to-thought, never an entity subsisting by itself” (Meillassoux 
After 36). In other words, this means that there is no way to think of anything outside of 
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the correlation of subject-object; to think the absolute would be illegitimate because any 
thinking would remain caught in what we think, therefore no one can claim legitimate 
knowledge of the absolute or come to know the thing-in-itself. The second tactic attached 
to strong correlationism, and this is more along the lines of Schelling’s thought, is 
“absolutizing the correlation itself” (Meillassoux 37). The absolutization of the 
correlation itself, according to Meillassoux, ignores the first principle of correlationism, 
and thus creates a system founded upon the correlation itself under a third term, which 
Schelling’s nature becomes in his work during the period of Naturphilosophie.  
 Meillassoux finds this most troubling, arguing that this amounts to a fideism, 
stating, “fideism is merely the other name for strong correlationism” (Meillassoux 48). 
What this absolutization reveals for Meillassoux is not that the thing-in-itself is known, 
nor that the impossible is possible for thought, but that “it is unthinkable that the 
unthinkable be impossible” (Meillassoux 41). This results, for Meillassoux, in “the most 
general thesis of the strong model [which] pertains to the existence of a regime of 
meaning that remains incommensurable with rational meaning because it does not pertain 
to the fact of the world, but rather to the very fact that there is a world” (Meillassoux 41). 
As a result, Meillassoux argues that strong correlationism has never been able to 
eliminate the reality of dogmatism because strong correlationism makes the same 
mistake, that is, that existence cannot be thought as ungrounded. In other words, 
correlationism is at fault because it thinks something must come from nothing; therefore 
it must entail that existence is capable of being thought because the impossibility of 
existence is itself impossible. In this sense, Meillassoux’s critique challenges every 
correlationist philosophy to account for the absolute contingency of reality. If they 
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cannot, Meillassoux maintains that any philosophy that falls under the model of 
correlationism is responsible for the widespread religiosity of contemporary philosophy, 
which amounts to a tacit acceptance and subordination to theism. The radical failure of 
critical philosophy, according to Meillassoux, would not be that it could not account for 
the absolute, but that it has led to the destruction of metaphysics, because it is incapable 
of thinking unreason as the absolute possibility of all existence. 
 Yet, contrary to Meillassoux, I argue that Schelling’s maintenance of strong 
correlationism in the First Outline, and by the same token the maintenance of any 
correlationism, is necessary for a reading that is transported to the écriture of the text. 
The critical turn, insofar as it is a critique of pure reason, is a critique of the methodology  
for how one approaches the absolute, which, as a result, has laid the foundation for 
deconstruction. The act of deconstruction as a reading, a process, or an activity that 
separates and critiques the opposition between text and sub-text, that reads that which 
removes itself from the text, and as a philosophy that occupies itself with writing, would 
not exist if not for the critical tradition that came after Kant and exists as a result of his 
efforts. Indeed, what Meillassoux fails to recognize, but what Schelling recognized early 
on in the Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism, is that correlationism, or 
what Schelling called criticism, was always aware of its inability to disprove dogmatism, 
since the “Critique of Pure Reason has taught dogmaticism how it can become 
dogmatism” (Schelling PL 169). For criticism approaches the absolute in a similar way to 
dogmatism but from a different point of departure; that is, criticism recognizes, to a 
certain extent, that the in-itself removes itself from difference so as to constitute 
difference. Further, as opposed to dogmatism, criticism is critically aware of its own 
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systematic organization as a philosophy that begins from the point of the cognitive 
faculty rather than from a point of objective or subjective truth; as Schelling writes, “the 
Critique of Pure Reason started its contention from that point alone. How did we ever 
come to judge synthetically?” (Schelling, PL 164). If we begin from this point, then, the 
Critique provides contentions from within its own structure, inscribing at its limits the 
process by which those limits are themselves produced and complicated, asserted and 
subverted, or written and underwritten.  
What distinguishes Schelling from Kant, though, is that he extends the 
consequences of the critical philosophy out towards the practical side of philosophy, 
transporting transcendental idealism into the realm of the philosophy of nature; if 
theoretical practices that seek the unconditioned are “unable to realize the unconditioned, 
it [theoretical philosophy] therefore demands the act through which it ought to be 
realized” (Schelling PL 167). In other words, Schelling was aware of the limitations of 
theoretical as well as critical philosophy, as Grant rightly argues, for he recognizes the 
gap between subjective idealism and the philosophy of nature as being constitutive and 
fundamental. Criticism was never meant to establish one philosophy that explains all of 
existence; instead, “from the idea of a system as such, the Critique of Pure Reason has 
first proved that no system, whatever its name, is, in its consummation, an object of 
knowledge, but merely an object of an activity [Handlung], a practically necessary but 
infinite activity” (Schelling PL 171). This necessary and infinite activity becomes for 
Schelling the opposition of subjective idealism and nature as two diametrically opposed 
systems that enter into a dialectical relation with each other, not as a system of 
knowledge but as a system that writes about the absolute in the process of its own 
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becoming. Criticism, in the way Schelling develops it, is evident in the works during the 
period in which he wrote the First Outline and even, yet in a more limited capacity, in the 
System of Transcendental Idealism. Finally this critical writing reaches a more complex 
and mature exposition in the Freedom essay and in the three extant versions of The Ages 
of the World as Schelling further sets nature in opposition to the subject of God as a way 
to think the in-itself. It is not until these later works, though, that the opposition acquires 
a more existential sensibility, whereas the First Outline and the System stay more within 
the bounds of their genre’s systematic limitations, the former within the realm of nature 
or the object and the latter remaining more within the realm of the intelligence or the 
subject. 
In this sense, strong correlationism turns into a creative process rather than an 
absolute, fixed cognitive framework as Meillassoux has argued. Because the 
correlationist project fails to close off the possibility of thinking the absolute, its failure 
leads to a writing that underwrites systematic philosophy’s attempts at closure, once 
again opening the point that once seemed to limit, constrain, or suppress the system’s 
activity. Schelling’s sustained strong correlationism, insofar as it absolutizes the 
correlationist model developed by Kant by grounding nature as the in-itself, leads to a 
system that begins from the point of the unrestrained absolute in an attempt to maintain 
and close off the correlationist circle established between subject and object, intelligence 
and nature, ideal and real, and, most importantly in the First Outline, productivity and 
product. Yet, taking the absolute as the point of departure in order to lead to the system’s 
closure proves to be yet another radically different means of opening and unbounding the 
unthinkability of the absolute by unleashing upon it those repressed things that it kept 
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hidden and in the dark. In this sense, Schelling’s correlationism brings the unthinkable 
face to face with its own impossibilities, complicating the absolute by means of its own 
postulates.  
In the First Outline, nature is that unrestrained absolute, that “unconditioned,” 
(Schelling First Outline 13) from which the system originates and from which it is 
produced, “insofar as it is at once productive and product” (Schelling First Outline 194). 
This figure of the absolute, contrary to Meillassoux and Grant, inaugurates an auto-
deconstructive writing of nature in the First Outline precisely because it is a work that 
upsets the opposition between nature and spirit or Naturphilosophie and transcendental 
idealism as a result of its auto-genesis (auto-poeisis) and, by the same token, its auto-
deconstruction. Schelling’s theorization of the absolute, as an absolute that generates 
itself from out of itself, thus unworks any naïve conception of the peaceful 
complementarity between subject and object or nature and spirit, which reveals a 
violence that lay subjacent underneath the apparent and normative organization of the 
text. Therefore, the First Outline, as will be shown, represents a writing through which 
Schelling thinks the absolute, wherein nature is a figure of this writing rather than, as 
Grant argues, the core principle of Schelling’s entire philosophy. We therefore read the 
First Outline in continuity with the rest of Schelling’s works, not as the site of the origin 
or as the beginning. To do so would be to misrepresent the First Outline as the 
achievement and solution of idealist philosophy, rather than as an instance of idealism’s 
crisis itself. 
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1. 3 The Incommensurable Introduction 
However, a little history behind the writing of the First Outline is necessary 
before we begin any theorization of the writing of nature itself. Keith R. Peterson, the 
translator and editor of the most recent translation of the First Outline, based his 
translation of the text on “volume 7 (2001) of the historical-critical edition published by 
the Schelling Commission in affiliation with the Bayern Academy of Sciences” (Peterson 
xxxvii). Maintaining the “unpolished quality” of the original lecture notes and preserving 
“Schelling’s use of emphasis and liberal employment of the em dash,” (Peterson ibid.), 
Peterson has presented the reader with a text that is as close to the spirit of Schelling’s 
lectures as when they were first presented in Jena in 1799. Unlike the original lecture 
notes, Peterson inserted chapter headings according to the framework provided in 
Schelling’s “Outline of the Whole,” which Peterson has also placed before the actual 
exposition of the First Outline. Peterson’s insertion, however, does not stick with the 
writing of the text, since its function as a guiding supplement cannot subdue the 
unruliness of the text; indeed the Outline’s brief summary does not stand a chance as it 
becomes radically undone through the text’s fuller exposition of its ideas.  
Alongside these, the First Outline is presented in the same book as the 
Introduction to the Outline, which was a piece that was written in the same year as, but 
issued separately from, the text in 1799. In relation to the main text, the Introduction to 
the Outline feels less like an outline or a preliminary rationale than an appendix that 
comes after the fact, trying to impose itself also as a guide to the First Outline, by trying 
to organize the body of the text whose organs and organization just are not there. 
Peterson, like the editors of the 19th-century Sämmtliche Werke edition of Schelling’s 
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works–but not like the Bayern Academy of Sciences edition from 19764–places the 
Introduction after rather than before the actual exposition of the First Outline.  Because 
the Introduction was always published this way, it thus acquires an oppositional and 
incongruous quality that contradicts the text that it is supposed to introduce. Unable to 
frame a text that resists the framing it imposes, there is nothing surprising about 
attributing a forceful quality on the Introduction in relation to the First Outline; why else 
would Schelling publish them separately and not as a whole?  
Furthermore, although I have chosen to use the title ‘First Outline’ provided by 
Peterson’s translation for this thesis, the German title, Erster Entwurf, also translates into 
English as ‘first design,’ ‘first project,’ or, most succinctly, as ‘first draft.’ The difference 
between the titles of ‘First Outline’ and ‘First Draft’ is that the text presents itself not as a 
finished product but one that is still in the process of its own production; therefore the 
text should be read more as a draft than as an outline. The First Outline’s lability, 
furthermore, in relationship to the univocal and unidirectional stability of the 
Introduction, complicates how one should read these texts together. Should they be read 
back to front or front to back? Further complications arise when one has to account for 
the multiplicity of footnotes and textual remarks that Peterson has included within the 
text in order to stay true to the “handwritten manuscript used by Schelling in the Jena 
lectures, [which was] unfortunately destroyed during the Second World War” (Peterson 
xxxvii), but was luckily appended to the Sämmtliche Werke edition as footnotes. 
Structurally, then, the First Outline has no proper beginning. The First Outline as well as 
the Introduction turn out to be drafts that attempt to begin, and anticipate in practice what 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Furthermore, a new edition of Schelling’s collected works is currently being prepared by the Bayern 
Academy of Sciences.   
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Schelling will later say in The Ages of the World: the beginning is always an eternal 
beginning, so that any and all beginning can never truly begin or end. And yet, although 
Schelling acknowledges in the Ages the eternal quality of beginning, beginning always 
desires and longs for an end, so much so that a beginning must try and find a point at 
which to begin; having once begun, beginning searches desperately for its end. Unlike the 
Ages, the First Outline is a text less concerned with how it begins, opting for a beginning 
that comes before the text, so that it thus experiments with what it presents as something 
already having begun or always already beginning. Yet the separate publication of the 
First Outline and the Introduction shows that beginning is not as simple or 
uncomplicated as these texts would have one believe. Analysis of the First Outline forces 
one to choose where the reading begins, all the while accepting that beginning from 
either the Introduction or the First Outline always already implies a gap that is 
fundamental to and prior to when and where either text posits their beginning. 
Yet due to this irresolvable problem of beginning–the problem that plagued 
Schelling for his whole life and continues to plague any approach to reading him–it does 
not matter which text one begins reading, because beginning is that which has already 
come before, insofar as it is already in the process of trying to begin again. That being 
said, why not begin with the Introduction, since it, in terms of its more generally accepted 
architectural position within texts, is that which wishes to be read first? But because it is 
that which desires to be read first, to be made the first priority over the text which it 
introduces, and because it presents itself in a seamless relationship or in a “most complete 
fusion” (Schelling FO 193) with the First Outline, the Introduction positions itself as the 
authoritative text that ‘speaks’ the true intentions of the author, when in fact the 
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Introduction exists apart and completely distinct from the First Outline not only in terms 
of its publication history but also in terms of its content and architectonic structure. 
For while the Introduction presents itself alongside the First Outline, it is more 
aligned with texts that are more traditionally associated with transcendental idealism, 
which is at once clear if we look at the language Schelling uses at the very beginning of 
the text. Words such as “intelligence”, “ideal world”, “genius”, “consciousness”, and 
“identity” (Schelling Introduction 193) are borrowed from Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason (“[a]nalytical judgments (affirmative) are therefore those in which the connection 
of the predicate with the subject is conceived through identity,” [Kant A7/B10; my 
emphasis] and Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre, “The nature of intelligence consists in this 
immediate unity of being and seeing” [Fichte 17; my emphasis]). Furthermore, these 
words are also more appropriate to the language Schelling uses in the System of 
Transcendental Idealism (1800) than to the language that is more specific to the First 
Outline. The language and rhetoric of transcendental idealism assumes a knowledge of 
what philosophy is, and, furthermore, assumes that the real should be subordinated to the 
ideal: “Since philosophy assumes the unconscious, or as it may likewise be termed, the 
real activity to be identical with the conscious or ideal, its tendency will be to bring back 
everywhere the real to the ideal–a process which gives rise to what is called 
transcendental philosophy” (Schelling Introduction 193). The immediate demand made 
by philosophy, which is more specifically transcendental philosophy, is to make identical 
that which is already separated into the real and the ideal without showing why this 
imperative simply assumes that there is a perfect complementarity between these opposed 
realms of philosophy.  
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The first truth of the Introduction, therefore, is not presented as a truth but as an 
assumption, and this assumption continues with regard to the “transition from a fluid to a 
solid state,” the existence of “regular forms,” and a symmetrical existence that not only 
connects nature to consciousness but to “external works of art, perfect in their kind” 
(Schelling Introduction 194; my emphasis). What becomes evident in the difference 
between the Introduction and the First Outline is that none of these stated truths are 
uncomplicated; neither are they systematically worked out as concepts as they would be 
in a work that actually completes and grounds the “system” of transcendental idealism. 
The Introduction, then, deserves the criticism which Hegel laid against Schelling in his 
Lectures on the History of Philosophy (1825-26): 
What is lacking in Schelling’s philosophy is thus the fact that the point of 
indifference of subjectivity and objectivity, or the Notion of reason, is absolutely 
pre-supposed, without any attempt being made at showing that this is the truth. 
Schelling often uses Spinoza’s form of procedure, and sets up axioms. In 
philosophy, when we desire to establish a position, we demand proof. But if we 
begin with intellectual intuition, that constitutes an oracle to which we have to 
give way, since the existence of intellectual intuition was made our postulate. 
(Hegel 525-526) 
 
But, being so preoccupied with Schelling’s deployment of the absolute as a principle by 
which one begins the system, Hegel cannot see the forest for the trees. Schelling, always 
the more enthusiastic German Idealist of the two, may seem to hastily connect the 
philosophy of nature with transcendental idealism, immediately “subordinat[ing] the real 
to the ideal” (Schelling Introduction 194), but makes it “the task of the philosophy of 
nature to explain the ideal by the real” (Schelling ibid.). By turning “two sciences” into 
“one science, differentiated only in the opposite orientation of their tasks” (Schelling 
Introduction 194), Schelling complicates the initial order of things which was previously 
established within the limits of transcendental philosophy. Once Schelling equates nature 
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with consciousness, neither nature nor consciousness can any longer account for the 
ground of its existence on its own terms, irrevocably transporting the grounds upon which 
both philosophies were founded into unknown areas of inquiry. Each, then, must be 
written, or re-written, by the other. If “everything in Nature is necessary merely because 
it is only through the medium of such a nature that self-consciousness can take place” 
(Schelling Introduction 194), self-consciousness becomes entirely dependent on the 
successful completion of the philosophy of nature, and vice versa. Consciousness, then, 
must think its body not as a limitation to thought but as crucially necessary for the 
possibility of thought in the first place, thereby disclosing that the possibility of thought 
arises as a result of thought’s unthought, unconscious beginnings. 
The philosophy of nature, therefore, disrupts the seamless and authoritative self-
assurance of transcendental philosophy forever by tying both philosophies’ outcomes 
together. And yet it is unclear whether this braid that Schelling begins to weave between 
these two separate philosophies can use transcendental philosophy as the third strand that 
will complete the approach towards the absolute; indeed, it is unclear whether or not the 
Naturphilosophie and transcendental idealism are even separate or identical in the same 
way that Schelling will later take these up in the Ages project. In fact, it is evident in 
Schelling’s writing that there is always a gap between these two philosophies, and any 
unity that is posited is either something yet to be completed and lies in the future or is a 
unity that is hastily asserted in bad faith; for if transcendental philosophy has its own 
methods for thinking the absolute, and those methods are incommensurable with the 
philosophy of nature (Schelling Introduction 194), the philosophy of nature turns out to 
be distinct and not complementary to transcendental philosophy’s grasp of the absolute. 
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If the philosophy of nature is as Schelling says, “an invasion of Nature” but also “an 
experiment” (Schelling Introduction 197), then how self-assured can transcendental 
philosophy be of its own scientific methods that contribute to the achievement of self-
consciousness?  
The science, or rather the technique, employed in both philosophies is revealed in 
the First Outline to be a science that is experimental rather than a self-evident and 
totalizing practice, and that only comes into being out of its own self-organization. 
Organization, therefore, becomes the third term by which these two philosophies are 
linked, as the Introduction and the System reveal their obsession with how organization 
organizes the parts that make up the whole. And yet organization in the Introduction is 
expressed as a priori, “[f]or if, in an organic whole, all things mutually bear and support 
each other, then this organization must have existed as a whole previous to its parts; the 
whole could not have arisen from the parts” (Schelling Introduction 198). In other words, 
Nature could not be being itself, at once both product and productivity, if it was not self-
sustaining. But, in the First Outline, organization becomes problematized by its non-
coexistence with itself, revealing that all systems are dependent upon contradiction, or 
upon an “asystaton, something non-coexistent” (qd. Grant Philosophies of Nature 1). 
Therefore, while Nature is rhetorically deployed as the means to organize the beings, the 
parts, or the organs that make up the whole of its organized body, the speculative nature 
of the First Outline is not complete as a purely empirical analysis of nature, because that 
would imply that the First Outline “regards its object in being, as something already 
prepared and accomplished” (Schelling Introduction 201).  
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The organization Schelling prefers for the First Outline above empiricism is 
science, which, as has been shown above, is an experimental practice. In opposition to 
empiricism, Schelling defines science as that which “views its object in becoming, and as 
something that has yet to be accomplished . . . it must set out from the unconditioned” 
(Schelling Introduction 201). However, since nature is both product and productivity, 
Schelling still requires a dual vision that sees nature in becoming in relation to nature in 
its simple products. “Nature,” writes Schelling, “as a mere product (natura naturata) we 
call Nature as object (with this alone empiricism deals). Nature as productivity (natura 
naturans) we call Nature as subject (with this alone all theory deals)” (Schelling 
Introduction 203). Nature’s organization is always split by the contradiction inherent to 
Schelling’s speculative project of the totality of objects; since he tries to maintain a view 
that balances empiricism and science, objects and totality, or the multitude and the 
singular within the organization of nature, the First Outline works through empiricism 
not as the appearance of “mere products” but views them as ungrounded products in 
becoming. In this sense, the First Outline is not a transcendental idealist text, insofar as it 
maintains a relation of the transcendental to its material existence. This makes for a 
transcendental materialism or a “theoretical empiricism,” as Rajan argues5, which cannot 
extricate itself from its correlation and therefore can never rightly be called self-same.  
Because the First Outline exposes the ungroundedness of the Idealist conception 
of organization by means of a transcendental empiricism, the concept of organization that 
is developed in System of Transcendental Idealism must be put under erasure. This is 
problematic, for in the System as in the First Outline empiricism remains suspect as that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Personal conversation.	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which merely intuits “everything entering the intelligence from without, [and] in fact 
explains, the nature of intelligence in a purely mechanical fashion” (Schelling System 
123). However, although the First Outline also sees empiricism in a similar fashion, it 
must still turn to empiricism in order to ground its speculations on the transcendental or 
theoretical productivity of nature. Therefore, if we hold up the First Outline to the System 
as a mirror, these mutually unground each other, insofar as the First Outline shows the 
System needs empiricism in order to ground itself, while the System shows the First 
Outline the necessity of an organizing theoretical figure without which the empirical 
would then become meaningless and arbitrary.  
But what is absent from the First Outline’s conception of organization and yet is 
present in the System’s is the rhetorical manipulation of the categorical limitations 
assigned to empiricism, which conveys a seamless complementarity between the 
intelligence and the universe. However, this fearless symmetry between the universe as 
macrocosm and self-consciousness as microcosm is dependent upon the imposed relation 
that connects the general concept of organization to the particular and individual concept 
of the organ.  
Yet if the intelligence is organic at all, as indeed it is, it has also framed to itself 
outwardly from within everything that is external for it, and that which constitutes 
the universe for it is merely the grosser and remoter organ of self-consciousness, 
just as the individual organism is the finer and more immediate organ thereof. 
(Schelling System 123) 
 
As it stands, organization is deployed as a synecdoche of the external manifestation of 
internal organs in order to at once affirm and conceal the gap that underwrites the radical 
diremption6 between the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of transcendental 
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idealism; organization therefore is strategically deployed to concretize the transcendental 
idealist project by subordinating nature to consciousness. The System presents 
organization in more transcendentally idealist terms, so that what at once organizes 
outside also operates upon and within the dialectical relation between the universe and 
the intelligence as a third principle that contains and legitimates the gradual succession of 
the universe towards the attainment of self-consciousness. Organization, then, is tied up 
with the linear discourse of history, since, as Schelling writes in the System, “succession 
must become objectified to it as organization, which is the first solution of our problem, 
as to how the intelligence intuits itself as productive” (Schelling System 123). In this way, 
organization is employed in order to contain the universe within the mind by internalizing 
that which is external, providing a rhetorical ground by which the intelligence may 
proclaim its productivity to be distinct from, as well as higher than, the productivity of 
the universe.  
Gone unquestioned, organization performs the role of a vanishing mediator that 
slips into the text and allows for one to slip over it, supplementing the concepts of 
intelligence, nature, succession, and history so that each can reflect onto each other a 
positive and real relation. 
[A]s the succession proceeds, organization too will achieve a greater extension, 
and depict within itself a larger portion of the universe. This will thus provide a 
graduated sequence running parallel to the development of the universe. The law 
of this sequence is that organization constantly enlarges its scope as the 
intelligence constantly extends it. (Schelling System 123) 
 
The extension of organization therefore means the simultaneous extension of the 
intelligence insofar as each mutually constructs the other, which Schelling uses to 
establish the narrative of a seamless progression of the universe into “one chain” 
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(Schelling Introduction 207). Only if the history of the mind and the history of the 
universe were perfectly reflected in each other in one perfect organization, could one 
really admit the completion of the idealist project. But, since the ground of organization 
itself turns out to be ungrounded, it becomes obvious that Schelling characterized it as a 
priori only in order to fulfill a linear and positivist completion of history that the System 
sets up as the end goal of Idealism. This is accomplished by the way that Schelling writes 
out this idea of organization as the figure that envelopes all of time and space; however, 
organization is not actual but is rather a metaphorical representation of organization as a 
mirror that reflects so that “the intelligence [can intuit] the evolution of the universe, so 
far as this falls within its intuition, in terms of an organization, [so that] it will intuit this 
latter as identical with its own self” (Schelling System 122). Organization, though, is not 
a static illustration, a mirror, or a tool; on the contrary, organization, like nature in the 
First Outline, exists only in the process of its own becoming, and is never at any point 
complete, for it is infinitely organizing itself towards a point of indifference it cannot 
reach. Organization as a principle cannot even guarantee the trajectory of its own 
organizing, since the rhetorical reliance and emphasis that Shelling’s writing lays upon it 
in the Introduction and the System only belies its auto-immune character in the First 
Outline. While transcendental idealism tries to organize the subjective and objective 
realms together into a synthetic point of unity, the project of the First Outline,  that is, 
that which is carried out by means of speculative physics is very much a part of the 
braiding of these two philosophies together in which each of these furthers and 
ungrounds the other, occupying itself with the ungrounded “original causes of motion in 
Nature” (Schelling Introduction 196). Even within the Introduction, there is a subjacent 
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anxiety over whether speculative philosophy can complete the chain of history, as 
Schelling questions the certainty of the project of speculative physics: 
Now, we may indeed be quite certain that every natural phenomenon, through 
whatever number of intermediate links, stands in connection with the last 
conditions of Nature. . . . Speculative physics has nothing to do but to show the 
need of these intermediate links; but since every new discovery throws us back 
upon a new ignorance, and while one knot is being loosed a new one is being tied, 
it is conceivable that the complete discovery of all the intermediate links in the 
chain of Nature, and therefore also our science itself, is an infinite task. (Schelling 
Introduction 199) 
 
In this sense, the Introduction becomes a site of transition that tries to perform both the 
discourses of the First Outline and the System in one text. This results in a disfiguration 
of both discourses, demonstrating how the encounter between both these texts mutually 
ungrounds each of them and ultimately puts the organization of both texts under erasure. 
1. 4 Writing Nature Otherwise 	  
Jumping over the gap which separates the Introduction from the First Outline, we 
return once again to the opening lines of the “Outline of the Whole”: “Because to 
philosophize about nature means as much as to create it, we must first of all find the point 
from which nature can be posited into becoming” (Schelling First Outline 5). From the 
outset the First Outline already encounters its first insurmountable obstacle, the point, or 
the moment, from which nature begins. This results from Nature’s determinate identity. 
Nature, as Schelling defines it, is “BEING ITSELF” (Schelling First Outline 13); it is at 
once both the infinite production and absolute inhibition of itself. Yet how did nature as 
unconditioned and pure productivity ever encounter such a radical and absolute inhibition 
that could have resulted in the first point of becoming? It turns out, as David Farrell Krell 
notes, that “Schelling is never able to answer these questions, each of which circles about 
the very problem he calls “insoluble.” What he learns repeatedly is that heterogeneity can 
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never be merely “introduced” into homogeneity” (Krell Tragic Absolute 50). It is 
precisely because of this circular rotation around this insoluble problem that Schelling’s 
First Outline immediately overturns homogeneity in favour of heterogeneity, although 
the text still calls for the process of heterogeneity to end. For once the text has begun, its 
beginning is always eternally beginning, so that the text calls out for that homogeneous 
point to put an end to nature’s endless productivity. Whereas some may point to nature as 
being this unified point, since Schelling represents nature as the point of identity between 
both productivity and product, the First Outline is unable to convincingly demonstrate 
that point at which heterogeneity transitions into absolute homogeneity. This duality 
inherent to nature gives way to a writing of nature in the First Outline that unworks the 
progressive history and organization that is ascribed to nature, evolution, and productivity 
by writing a nature that is at odds with itself and is not self-same but is in fact never-
ending. 
This is to say that the kind of productivity seen in the First Outline does not 
proceed according to the rationale that narrates the unfolding of nature’s progress; rather, 
nature rejects rationality in favour of an irrational overproduction that wildly exceeds the 
limits which the text imposes to guide nature towards the archetype of some absolute 
organism. This overproduction is reflected in the writing of the text, in the excessive and 
profligate production of footnotes, questions, and re-formulations that intersperse the 
reading, which interrupts, in the words of Georges Bataille, the “restricted economy” 
which the text appears to write and reveals the more “general economy” that the text’s 
architectonic actually presents7. These footnotes are, in the words of Jean-Luc Nancy, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7In Georges Bataille’s The Accursed Share, he writes of the difference between general and restricted 
economies: “There can be anguish only from a personal, particular point of view that is radically opposed 
	  	  
26 
“expressions” or Remarks that are not merely summed up as appendices to the text. 
Instead, Nancy writes, 
[a]n economy of Remarks seems to double up the economy of logical discourse: 
an economy of remarks, that is, a subordinated “detached” dispersed economy 
that does not obey the strict progression of the concept but rather chance 
encounters between the text and the good or (ill) fortunes of the writer” (Nancy 
Speculative Remark 48). 
 
These footnotes also serve a second purpose, insofar as they are a manifestation of the 
text’s écriture that reflects the volatile and ever-shifting trajectory of nature’s wildly 
deranged production. Though Schelling may have failed to answer the question from 
whence did nature begin, the way nature is philosophically written and developed 
unworks and dislodges it from the discourse of transcendental idealism that limits its 
auto-genesis, inviting the reader to read nature otherwise and discover the limitless 
potential that once lay subjacent, dark, and hidden within it. 
1. 5 Natural History 
 
The First Outline’s architectonic is spread out among three divisions: the first 
deals with a discussion of nature as the absolute, the second with the elucidation of three 
possible systems of anorganic nature, and the third explains John Brown’s theory of 
excitability. Through these, Schelling presents nature as an activity that can be deduced 
as a “dynamic graduated series of stages” (Schelling First Outline 54) and hence be given 
to thought as a “natural history” (Schelling First Outline 44). But, as the divisions within 
the text itself show, Schelling is incapable of writing out this natural history 
systematically, for the First Outline is rather an assemblage of disparate articulations 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
to the general point of view based on the exuberance of living matter as a whole. Anguish is meaningless 
for someone who overflows with life, and for life as a whole, which is an overflowing by its very nature” 
(Bataille The Accursed Share 39). 
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about nature than it is a coherent history of successive stages of development. 
Nevertheless, as opposed to Kant, who imagines natural history as a history of objects 
that places them within a certain time and place in nature, Schelling figures the concept 
of natural history in terms later developed by Joseph Henry Green, a British Idealist 
thinker, who introduces the idea of thinking nature through “physiogony.” Physiogony, 
according to Green, is,  
the history of nature, which studies this history as “preface and portion of the 
history of man,” so as to make the “knowledge of Nature” a “branch of self-
knowledge” (103). . . . For Green physiogony becomes anthropology, as he 
subsumes the history of nature into a temporalized Chain of Being in which 
nature works her way up from “the polypi to the mammalia,” “labour[ing] in birth 
with man” (101–6). (Rajan “Excitability” 315-316) 
 
This approach to natural history, on the other hand, remains tied up with the project of 
transcendental idealism developed in the System, which views nature as a “primordial 
original” that is at once both free in the actions of the products it produces and necessary 
“through the confinement and conformity to law inherent in her” (Schelling System 199).  
Yet, as opposed to the System, Tilottama Rajan writes, “[n]ot only is this text hardly a 
system so much as an assemblage, and thus a dissension or ‘strife’ of systems” (Rajan 
“Excitability” 317); the First Outline’s attempts to “fit” or “sublate” history, empiricism 
and various sciences–such as those developed by John Brown, J. H. Green, and Johann 
Christian Reil–into a writing of spirit through nature, results in Schelling finding these 
sciences writing spirit (Rajan “Excitability 317). The text, therefore, offers the reader an 
instance of what Hegel had said of Schelling, that he “worked out his philosophy in view 
of the public” (Hegel Lectures 513), since the text boldly and visibly divulges its 
experimental style, allowing the public to view nature’s very real struggle with its own 
becoming. Reading nature in the First Outline in a straightforward manner becomes 
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nearly impossible, for reading is led through a series of dissensions, inner conflicts, and 
contradictions that end up dissolving any progression that would amount to an end. This 
results in the dissolution of the architectonic of a “dynamic graduated series of stages,” 
set up by Schelling to guide the text, into the indifferent fluid and luxurious development 
that is written out in the philosophy of nature. 
 The natural history which the text intends to write out is therefore undermined by 
the formless and infinite productivity of nature, which Schelling wrote in order to 
circumvent the traditional analysis of nature according to empiricism in favour of a 
construction of nature that metaphysically encapsulates it as both product and 
productivity. It is impossible to “know nature as product,” Schelling writes, for nature is 
known “only as active”; since “being itself is = to activity, then the individual being 
cannot be an absolute negation of activity” (Schelling First Outline 14). This perspective 
on nature is afforded by the intuition of it as an infinite product, since no finite product 
can provide actual knowledge of nature as both pure product and pure productivity. If 
nature cannot be empirically determined except through an “empirically infinite series,” 
then it can only be “presented by infinite becoming” (Schelling First Outline 15). Nature, 
as that which straddles the line between being and nothing, as a principle of being, that 
itself is not, and yet “manifests itself in each natural object” (Schelling First Outline 13) 
is therefore neither merely being nor nothing, but slips imperceptibly into becoming as 
that which has already been. The reason for this is that Schelling cannot pinpoint when 
nature began in the same way that Nancy describes Hegel as not being able to pinpoint 
when it is that the Aufehbung begins, since “[i]t has always been too early or too late for 
determining. . . . [T]he whole logic of sublation has occurred in the sliding of a word and 
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in the slipping of the text on this word” (Nancy Speculative Remark 40). Speculative 
philosophy can only assume that the book of nature is and has always presently been in 
the process of its own becoming, and, henceforth, ascribes to nature the quality of infinite 
becoming, as it could not be otherwise thought or unthought.  
 In the same way that Nature can only ever imperceptibly enter into becoming, so 
too does philosophy only enter into nature by means of a free “invasion,” for, as 
Schelling writes, “it would certainly be impossible to get a glimpse of the internal 
construction of Nature if an invasion of Nature were not possible through freedom” 
(Schelling First Outline 196). That is, philosophy enters freely into its theorization of the 
absolute as nature by means of the freedom of speculative philosophy. Through 
speculative philosophy, as an experimental writing, Schelling writes that nature is at once 
infinite productivity and the absolute product. Yet if we consider this creation of nature 
as at once a theorization as well as a writing of nature, an analogous question emerges 
between the two: how does one account for the permanence of objects in nature 
considered as absolute productivity or how does one account for the emergence of a text 
from the infinite process of writing? Schelling’s tenuous answer lies in the relation 
between the encounter of two opposed operations, processes, or what Schelling calls 
“tendencies” in nature, 
Let one force be thought, originally infinite in itself, streaming out in all 
directions from one central point; then this force will not linger in any point of 
space for a moment (thus leaving space empty), unless an energetic activity 
opposing (retarding) its expansion did not give it a finite velocity). . . . [It] must 
be assumed that no product in nature can be the product in which those opposed 
activities absolutely coincide, i.e., in which Nature itself attained rest. One must, 
in a word, simply deny all permanence in Nature itself. (Schelling First Outline 
17). 
 
The appearance of products in nature, according to Schelling, simulates an apparent 
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permanence that conceals the productivity that lies behind it. The object, then, becomes 
for nature the limit of nature as subject (for nature as subject is always taken to mean 
nature as productivity, activity, becoming). The object, “the resting, permanent,” 
therefore, becomes the “chief problem of the philosophy of nature” (Schelling First 
Outline 17), as it is that which inconceivably inhibits nature as productivity. This 
opposition is not at all peaceful but is rather highly antagonistic and violent. Nature is 
“impetuous” in its retardation, and infinitely struggles against the products that appear in 
opposition to it. Therefore, nature attempts to “fill anew” each determinate product in an 
incessant “gush[ing]” of its force, but is forever traumatized by its encounter with its 
resistance, and is unable to overcome the dissenting voice that opposes it.  
The traumatic character of this opposition is more clearly expressed in one of the 
footnotes appended to the text, where Schelling conceives of nature as a stream that 
“flows in a straight line forward as long as it encounters no resistance”; yet “[w]here 
there is resistance–a whirlpool forms,” wherein every “original product of nature is such 
a whirlpool, every organism” (Schelling First Outline 18). The whirlpool, like the 
organism, is never immobile or permanent, but is something “constantly transforming” 
and is said to be constantly reproduced at each moment by the vivifying force of nature. 
However, the whirlpool does not reflect the discourse of the main text. Instead, these 
whirlpools that are in constant transformation demonstrate that the main text is itself not a 
restricted economy but is rather more general; although the footnotes appear separate and 
distinct from the main text, they interact with and still belong to the economy of the text 
by doubling it. In the same way as when the activity of nature encounters a whirlpool and 
leaves that “stream of Nature’s activity . . . broken” or, even more traumatically, 
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“annihilated” (Schelling First Outline 18), the footnotes unwork the operation of nature 
as “pure identity” by redirecting its production and reciprocally derange it. This footnote, 
like many others in the text, involutes the stream downwards inside the unfathomable 
depths of its resistance against the text and then sends the stream back outwards, not as it 
was before, but transformed and changed. In this way, the footnotes pose a threat to the 
“organic totality” of the main text, putting the authority–as both the government and 
author of the text–of nature under erasure. Instead of clarifying the main text, the 
footnotes frustrate the trajectory of the text, and demonstrate that, like the whirlpools, the 
text is not a composite organization but a “whole of articulated singularities.” Moreover, 
as Nancy would say, “[a]rticulation does not mean organization,” since “by itself” it is 
rather “a juncture, or more exactly the play of the juncture” (Nancy Inoperative 
Community 76). In this way, every product is a singularity that is articulated by 
something that does not actually participate or guarantee the organization of products, but 
merely assumes, plays with, or slides these distinct and incommensurable pieces of 
nature’s puzzle–product versus productivity–together in an experiment hoping for good 
results. 
The figure that Schelling introduces in order to inhibit and guide the text’s 
overproduction is the figure of the originary actants. Within the hierarchy of principles 
presented within the text the actants appear lower than the higher principle of nature; they 
too do not exist in space and, like nature, are originary productivities as well; however, 
actants cannot amount to nature even if all of them were amassed together, since they are 
at once originary productivities that are “truly singular”; each is “in itself whole and 
sealed-off, and represents, as it were, a natural monad” (Schelling First Outline 21). 
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Schelling’s naturalization of the Leibnizian monad is here used to construct a multiplicity 
of singularities that are both individual and “inconstructible” because they are the “limit 
of all construction by virtue of which every construction is a determinate one” (Schelling 
First Outline 22). As such, actants provide the simple originary principle by which nature 
as infinite productivity can transfer its absolute force into restricted forces, determinate 
articulations, or propositions that are the substrate of all material products, much like the 
Higgs-Boson in quantum physics that provides the field that gives matter its mass. 
Actants, therefore, are not the originary force but are the mediate principles that transmit 
this force as “alterations” (Schelling First Outline  22) of that force, “alterations–of 
cohesive force, of density, of specific gravity” (Schelling First Outline 23). These 
alterations, however, only exist because they have previously formed into one unified 
inhibition that resists the originary force of nature, opposing to it a collective activity to 
“strive toward one and the same product” (Schelling First Outline 24) and modify the 
originary force of nature into something different. The actants, then, present the natural 
inhibition required for nature to enter into becoming, so that the indifferent activity of 
productive nature encounters the necessary difference of multiple and individual 
productivities that complete nature as the most original duality. In this sense, the actants’ 
relationship to nature as the inhibitive concept that sets nature into becoming is much like 
the notion of the “violence” of writing in Derrida and Paul de Man’s sense of 
deconstruction, insofar as writing is always an activity or a force that moves towards the 
creation of something out of nothing; writing is that which excludes that which comes 
before it as a force that does not merely negate it but makes it the possibility for 
production. Nature’s productivity can never actually be since it requires the actants to 
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recover productivity from its fundamental excessiveness and then direct these into 
formations, into words, or what are also known as the apparent products of nature. 
 Actants, in this sense, perform a second function by organizing and dispensing 
the infinite productivity of nature into restricted and yet mutual channels that Schelling 
can later use in order to initiate the economy of the graduated stages of nature, “[f]or two 
different actants, there must be one common point in which they unite–(this point will be 
named–at a much lower level to be sure–the chemical product)” (Schelling First Outline 
24). And yet, as soon as the concept of the actant is articulated, it is undone by yet 
another footnote. The spectral nature of the actant as an inhibitive and productive point in 
the system is revealed once Schelling further questions the possibility of investigating the 
reality of the actants: “but the question is by what means these alterations have been 
produced, and this has not been answered by any previous research; and that question lies 
far higher–and yet deeper, and ultimately in the construction of matter” (Schelling First 
Outline 23). Insofar as the actants are the principle that explains how matter can come to 
occupy space, as the writing that writes the words of the book of nature, it is ironic that 
the remark makes the origin of the actants dependent upon the answer to the paradox of 
materiality. In the same way as writing only exists insofar as it is in the process, in the 
activity of writing, the actants can only be insofar as we consider them in tandem with the 
construction of matter. The actants and matter then are mutually constructive and 
deconstructive, as the footnote unworks the trajectory of the text and tangles any distinct 
determination of firstness and secondness between productivity and product, since the 
question of materiality presses in upon the text too early for the text to process or digest 
it. While the main text is still in the midst of articulating itself, the articulation of the 
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actant is seized by the voice of the footnote, which interrupts the temporal progression 
that would see nature exit out of the realm of pure productivity into the specific 
productivities of the actants that sustain the creation of the products or the matter of 
nature.  
1. 6 The Paradox of the Product 
 
As it turns out, when Schelling had said that the chief problem of the philosophy 
of nature was the problem of “rest” or “permanence,” he did not mean that since nature is 
already known to be active, we must account for where the idea of permanence 
originates. Definitely not. Rather, permanence, rest, and the heterogeneity of matter 
become the chief problem for the philosophy of nature since they are that which 
interrupts, eludes, and complicates the exposition of nature as simultaneously that which 
is absolute productivity and product. Whenever nature must account for the existence of 
matter, it is shown to be in dis-union with itself, throwing the concept of a totalizable 
organization into dissolution. The only option left for the philosopher of nature is to 
repress the gap that separates nature from its product, evidenced by yet another footnote 
that addresses the question of how to “find the point in which this infinite multiplicity of 
diverse actants can be unified in Nature” (Schelling First Outline 24). It is revealed that 
the “dynamical philosophy cannot even arrive at this problem” since it is not concerned 
with the “constituents” that make up the product of nature, because it assumes “the 
constituents are given through the product. The dynamist, therefore, does not ask how the 
product originates from these constituents; for the product precedes the constituents” 
(Schelling First Outline 24). But, as the footnote demonstrates, the articulation of 
precedence does not reflect the reality of the unfolding of nature, nor does it authorize the 
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sovereignty of nature over its product. Thus, the remark, like matter, slips into the 
temporal and hierarchical organization of the text where it rhetorically should not belong 
but unquestionably exists. 
Suspending for a moment the voice of the footnotes that consistently point to the 
unexplained “cause of the force of cohesion” (Schelling First Outline 26) that unites the 
actants into one absolute inhibition of nature’s productivity, let us turn to the way that 
Schelling writes out the combination of actants as providing once again another 
derangement of the whole organization of the text. In a remark Schelling describes the 
cohesive force of nature as a “composite force” that is itself distinct from the “attractive 
force” that attracts the actants towards each other. Cohesion “strives against the 
universality of the attractive force, for it constantly individualizes and leaves the space 
outside the sphere within which it alone works empty” (Schelling First Outline 26). 
Granted that the force of cohesion cannot be accounted for, Schelling experiments with 
the idea that the totality of actants are organizable into a single unified action but remain 
individually distinct and free from each other. This, however, is maintained in order to 
sustain a rhetoric of regulative formation that imposes upon nature “a continual 
determination of figure from the crystal to the leaf, from the leaf to the human form” 
(Schelling First Outline 26), which follows the physiogonic history that establishes a 
typological continuity between nature as that which prefigures the fulfilled figure of man 
as the apex of creation. Yet, typology goes unfulfilled as each actant “deranges” the other 
in the same way that the footnotes derange nature’s approach towards the “production of 
the originary figure” (Schelling First Outline  26-27). The result of this mutual 
derangement in   
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the most original and most absolute combination of opposed actions in Nature [is] 
the most original fluidity, which. . . presents itself as a universally extended entity 
that simply works against nonfluidity (solidity), and continually endeavors to 
liquefy everything in Nature. (Schelling First Outline 27) 
 
It is, therefore, that nature has finally produced its first, its most original product, 
the fluid, insofar as it is that “which comes nearest to pure productivity,” since, as 
Schelling writes, “[the] nearer Nature is to pure productivity the more formless, the 
nearer to the product, the more formed” (Schelling First Outline 27). Fluidity negates all 
individuation, having no desire or need to form into anything determinate, and hence 
must be the first product since it is the furthest distance from the absolute product. As 
such, the fluid is opposed to the actants, which remain individual and completely sealed 
off, and the opposition between the two furnishes “the drama of a struggle between form 
and formless” (Schelling First Outline 28). Pitted against each other in eternal opposition, 
actant and fluid dialectically provide the ground for the becoming of nature, since nature 
can never fall into absolute fluidity nor can it collapse into an absolute solidity. This 
endless struggle is the theatrical performance of the history of the “various stages of 
development of one and the same absolute organism,” which Schelling aptly calls an 
“ever-changing Proteus” (Schelling First Outline 28). The philosophy of nature therefore 
posits a positive sea change in the future, hoping that the absolute organism will at one 
point resolve its duality and put itself to rest. Yet, as is known in Greek mythology, 
Proteus, the god of the sea change, changes his shape in order to avoid telling the future, 
not so that he may reveal it.  
Therefore, it is appropriate that Schelling attributes the title of “ever-changing 
Proteus” to nature, for it expresses the unpredictability and instability of the absolute 
organism as a body without organs. Like the whirlpool and the fluid, Proteus represents 
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the unruliness of metaphorical language that Schelling experimentally uses to organize 
the disparate elements of the text and articulate nature as a process in infinite becoming. 
Yet the writing of these figures is caught in the same infinite transmutations that 
characterize nature in the same way as the whirlpools are in constant transformation. 
Each represents another instance of the eternal beginning that tries to collect and present 
an order of things but lacks the rule and order of history, since the text delays its moment 
of unification for a time posited well into the future but which the text itself cannot 
presently resolve. In this sense, the constant transformation and unrest of nature as pure 
productivity as well as pure product resembles the writing of the text itself, a writing of 
nature that cannot find its end once it begins, unleashing upon Schelling, as the writer, a 
boundless object that repeatedly rejects the limits or directions which he tries to carefully 
inscribe and re-inscribe. As nature reveals itself to be non-coexistent with itself, so too 
does the text reveal to us the readers its own incommensurable and split identity. 
This split, therefore, becomes the problem that Schelling encounters with the 
guiding structure of the stages of development, which posits a future at rest that is united 
in the completion of itself as absolute product. Each stage of development is written as 
contained within the gamut of development from the lowest to the highest stage, 
providing a proportion of the determinate permutations of each organism that leads up to 
the production of the absolute product. But because Nature, as has been noted above, 
detests the individual, viewing each as “misbegotten attempts” (Schelling First Outline 
35) towards the final evolved product, nature as pure productivity constantly strives to 
eliminate the products which it produces. However, this antagonism against the 
individual arises only in the context of Nature’s commitment to the project of the stages 
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of nature, which is not necessarily an anthropology, but is rather characteristic of the 
indifference and frigidity of a totalitarian history. While it is true that Nature struggles 
against each product and must tarry with the necessary process of formation that grounds 
the generation of individuals, once the individual reaches the stage of sexual, and hence 
reproductive, formation, Schelling writes that “[t]he development of the sexes is merely 
the highest zenith of the process of formation, for it occurs by means of the same 
mechanism through which progressive growth actually takes place” (Schelling First 
Outline 37). The life of the individual, therefore, may mean very little from a cosmic 
point of view, as it is reducible to merely a transition of forces that intensify within it and 
then dissipate out into nature. And yet, once the individual reaches the point of sexual 
maturity, it has, in that moment, reached the apex of its own formation as the highest 
expression of Nature and from then on assumes the destiny of its own reproduction. The 
individual, therefore, represents yet again the infinite work of writing, insofar as “[e]ach 
product of nature can split again into new products,” since “Nature organizes, where it 
organizes, to infinity” (Schelling First Outline 44). The autonomy of the individual 
represents, in this sense, the autonomy of the text as an unfixed product whose split 
identity divides and is reproduced infinitely in a reading that is never at once finished but 
forever reproduces into ever-narrowing spheres of interpretation. 
What Schelling’s writing thus points to is the impossibility of any point from 
which one can write the beginning or the end of the history of nature. The First Outline 
expresses a translinear rather than a unilinear direction towards the absolute product that 
completely undoes the writing of the reproductive potential of the absolute organism. The 
First Outline thus provides a completely different process as opposed to the one imposed 
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upon it by the Introduction, a process of dissent that elicits new forms and new 
individuals which inhibit the process of nature’s self-organization. If to philosophize 
about nature, then, amounts to creating it, the First Outline, written as it was in the midst 
of the Introduction and the System, emerges as a singular and idiosyncratic writing that is 
auto-deconstructive of its legislative position, demanding a submission of nature to its 
own profligate exchange between economies of restriction and excess, and which at no 
point will see nature as productivity dominate over its eternally reproducing products.  
At the end of our reading of this text, Schelling’s representation of Nature as a 
linear stream with a beginning, a middle, and an end becomes insupportable. The figure 
of nature as an absolute product or absolute organism turns out to be the absolute 
expression of the overproduction and agglomeration of its whirlpooling products that are 
forever transforming, deranging, and evolving out into nothingness or infinitude. If one 
would, at this point, interpret the pathos of this writing of nature, it would be a nature that 
wishes its book to end, a writing that seeks the respite of death in order to escape the at 
once eternal but also bottomless suffering imposed upon it by its entrance into life. This 
reading is as kind as it is cruel, for it seeks to take care of the text by letting itself be 
transported to the writing, only in order to find the writing helpless as to the direction it is 
taking itself. It is cruel on account of the reader’s helplessness to guide the text towards 
its own avowed desire for its euthanasia, since to bestow the gift of death upon it would 
be impossible; for there is not one unified organism for one to administer the hemlock 
that would bring its wild thrashing, its twisted and agonized breathing, its deranged howls 
to an end. Unable to point to its beginning, nature cannot find its end. As a result, 
repression becomes the only means to carry on reading the history of nature as a history 
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of the absolute organism. Yet repression was always at work in the writing of the text, 
repressing the anarchy that resists and abstains from the work of order and history, which 
simultaneously sustains the writing of any absolute organism. The duality at the core of 
nature lies in writing, in language, and in the voice that speaks and philosophizes too, and 
is necessarily repressed so as to write in the first place. The First Outline, then, as an 
experimental and speculative draft unleashes this duality upon the text’s repressive 
superstructure laid out in the Introduction, opening up for Schelling new possibilities 
which he will write out in the Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human 
Freedom and later in The Ages of the World.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  
41 
	  	  
Keeping The World Within Bounds: Schelling’s Philosophical Investigations 
Into the Essence of Human Freedom 
2. 1 Introduction 
 
 “The only possible system of reason is pantheism” (Schelling Freedom 11), writes 
Schelling at the beginning of the Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human 
Freedom. Yet up until the writing of the Freedom essay in 1809, Schelling admits to 
never having written a “complete, finished system. . . . but rather” to having “shown only 
individual facets of such a system. . . . declar[ing] his works fragments of a whole” 
(Schelling Freedom 5). Therefore, in 1809, Schelling seems to mark the Freedom essay 
with the authority of a new beginning. Though as the last chapter showed, beginning for 
Schelling is a troublesome moment that always appears to have begun, and is a point 
which philosophy and writing always enter into in media res. This problem applies for 
the beginning of the absolute in the Freedom essay as well. Slavoj Žižek writes that, on 
the problem of beginning in both the Freedom essay and The Ages of the World, “with 
regard to the mode of presentation of the Absolute, logical deduction has to give way to 
mythical narrative” (Žižek The Indivisible Remainder 39). Here, Žižek’s point is that 
beginning for Schelling and for German Idealism is always tied up with a 
mythologization of the absolute, and that any beginning is always subject to the narrative 
which the philosopher arbitrarily constructs. In order to begin, then, Schelling writes the 
Freedom essay by means of the mythical narrative of the self-revelation of God, not in a 
traditional or orthodox retelling, but in a radical re-conceptualization of the narrative and 
écriture of theodicy and pantheism. Schelling meshes theodicy with pantheism, making 
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all things immanent in and co-dependent with the existence of God, but he also re-figures 
theodicy by turning evil into a necessary and actual force that is essential to God’s 
coming-into-existence. In this sense, the world, the universe, and “man,” writes 
Schelling, “[are] not outside of, but rather in, God and . . . [their] activity itself belongs to 
the life of God” (Schelling Freedom 12).  
Whereas theodicy is an important word for the Freedom essay, “pantheism” is 
really the site or the word upon which the text and Schelling speculate, in the sense 
developed by Jean-Luc Nancy in The Speculative Remark. Pantheism, for Schelling, is 
one of those speculative words that surprises and has in itself a speculative meaning that 
had not been understood until he had read it otherwise. Thus, pantheism becomes a 
means of writing and thinking through the problem of the idea of God or of God as 
beginning. Yet, pantheism is also used by Schelling in order to write over those gaps and 
pockmarks of God’s self-revelation by writing pantheism side by side with theodicy and 
God as figural seals, which function as ways of repressing the text’s aporetic and abyssal 
narrative. The Freedom essay, thus, illustrates a different kind of writing than the 
speculative and experimental writing of the First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of 
Nature or The Ages of the World. The Freedom essay represents a site of anxiety over the 
contingency of its own writing, and therefore represses the luxurious fluidity and 
ungrounded speculative style of Schelling’s experimental writings. Instead, the writing of 
the Freedom essay tries to impose continuity and linearity by using the figures of 
pantheism, theodicy, and God; yet, in so doing, these also open the Freedom essay up to a 
deconstructive reading. These figures do not provide the solution to the problem of 
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writing, but rather unleash upon the Freedom essay problems which further complicate 
its writing by initiating a return of the text’s repressed. 
This chapter, then, begins by revisiting Schelling’s meditations on pantheism in 
the Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism. There Schelling provides a 
reading of criticism and dogmatism that writes and rethinks the relation between the two 
philosophies in a way that he will once again take up in the Freedom essay’s figuration of 
pantheism, theodicy, and God; however, I argue, the Philosophical Letters are themselves 
a site of rupture and auto-immunity that will infect rather than seal off the Freedom essay 
from its own contingent writing. The next section will seek to uncover the differences 
between Spinoza and Schelling’s expositions of pantheism. Schelling’s adoption of 
pantheism also impacts the writing of Schelling’s system, for, while the Freedom essay 
represents a new beginning and a new way of thinking the question of the origin of 
existence, pantheism and theodicy introduce problems that make both the figure of “God” 
as writer as well as his author, Schelling, subject to their own deconstructive writing. The 
writing of the Freedom essay uses the figures of theodicy and pantheism as a means to 
evade the infinite task of writing that was at issue in the First Outline by means of the 
text’s articulation of the authority of God; however, in order to write out a narrative of 
theodicy, Schelling must inscribe within God a contradiction that must be resolved, that 
is, the conflict between good and evil. This writing of the conflict of good and evil within 
God opens a new rupture within the text, as the conflict of revelation subjects God to the 
contingency and suffering of his ground, and radically disfigures a united and perfect 
authority. For evil and good must equally be written since evil provides the necessary 
means by which God’s self-revelation can come to be, and yet evil is always potentially 
	  	  
44 
capable of annihilating that revelation. This relationship between God as he is in Himself 
and God as ground will thus occupy the third section of this chapter. God, I argue, is not 
some transcendental signifier that authorizes the text, but a figure that the Freedom essay 
constructs and deconstructs, since God is subject to the radical exposure of his own 
writing and to the writing of the text. Schelling’s introduction of pantheism and theodicy 
into his writing thus have the effect of opening the Freedom essay to the problems that 
lay hidden within this new figuration of God, making God the figure by which the text 
unbinds itself when it was supposed to be that which kept this world within bounds. 
2. 2 The Philosophical Letters 	  
The fact that the Freedom essay returns to pantheism and idealism is significant if 
we consider its initial publication history. The essay, according to the editors of its most 
recent publication, Jeff Love and Johannes Schmidt, was published in 1809 alongside a 
selection of Schelling’s other more idealist texts in Volume 1 “of what was to be a 
collected edition of Schelling’s writings published by Phillip Krüll in Landshut”; 
however no “further volumes were published” (Love and Schmidt Freedom 135). In the 
recent 2006 printing of the essay, the editors have provided the preface to the collection 
from 1809. There, because Schelling places these earlier idealist texts–which include the 
Philosophical Letters–in continuity with the Freedom essay, the preface is, in a sense, a 
site of self-reflexivity. This is to say that we can read the preface in a way that sees 
Schelling insisting on a continuity between his texts, figuring each earlier work as an 
instance that is part of his development towards the writing of the Freedom essay, the text 
that “is the first which the author puts forth his concept of the ideal part of philosophy 
with complete determinateness” (Schelling Freedom 4). The editors, on the other hand, 
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state that Schelling’s “self-interpretation may seem somewhat disingenuous to those who 
emphasize “Protean” discontinuity in Schelling’s work” (Love and Schmidt Freedom 
136), but also that Schelling’s plea for continuity in his works should not be taken lightly. 
Our reading chooses to posit itself somewhere in between these two interpretations by 
placing the Philosophical Letters in continuity with the Freedom essay, but in a way that 
emphasizes a continuity that itself is problematic as it opens both of these texts to their 
own deconstruction. In this sense, this reading does not focus on the fact that Schelling 
himself was protean, but that his writing was. 
The Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism, published in 1795, 
consist of a series of ten letters addressed to a fictional and unnamed interlocutor who 
serves as the audience of Schelling’s epistolary polemic. We have noted in the previous 
chapter that Schelling elaborates in the Letters a nuanced and critical reading of Kant’s 
critical philosophy and Spinoza’s enthusiastic dogmatism, positioning dogmatism as 
criticism’s foil. The Letters also introduce a focus on pantheism that will continue in the 
Freedom essay, making the Letters a methodological guide for reading the Freedom 
essay as an ongoing dialogue between dogmatism (as enthusiasm) and criticism (as 
absolute idealism). During the period of German Idealism, dogmatism and criticism were 
important terms that were polemically charged for Kant, Fichte, Hegel, and Schelling and 
meant different things for each of them. Generally for Fichte, and in a similar and yet 
contrasting way for Kant8, dogmatism was equated with transcendental realism, 
pantheism, and Spinoza, since dogmatism accounted for experience “from some 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 While Schelling uses the words pantheism, idealism, dogmatism, and criticism, in the Freedom essay he 
does not provide an elaborate or systematic definition of idealism in the same way as would Kant or Fichte. 
For more information on the development of Idealism according to the main figures of German Idealism, 
see Frederick Beiser’s German Idealism: The Struggle Against Subjectivism 1781-1801. 
	  	  
46 
transcendent principle beyond consciousness, the thing in itself (Ding an sich)”; on the 
other hand, criticism or idealism, for Ficthe, was something associated with 
consciousness and the capacity of the subject’s freedom to actualize its own existence, 
positing experience “from some immanent principle within consciousness, the self, the 
ego, or I in itself” (Beiser 261). However, Schelling does not see dogmatism or criticism 
in the same way as did Kant or Fichte. He uses these terms speculatively, expressing 
them as an opposing binary which he tries to dialectically work through rather than 
establishing them as exclusive philosophical activities. Unlike Kant and Fichte, for whom 
the argument of criticism becomes just as univocal as their opponent’s arguments for 
dogmatism, Schelling establishes dogmatism and criticism in the Letters as figures which 
are representative of the two philosophies of Spinoza and Kant that supplement each 
other in the same way as pantheism and idealism do in the Freedom essay. While it was 
traditional in German Idealism to equate pantheism with the words dogmatism and 
realism or criticism with idealism and freedom, between the Letters and the Freedom 
eassy we can read Schelling as trying to speculate on how to articulate these words in 
radical new directions that unravel their more generally accepted meaning.   
In the Letters, then, Schelling’s analysis focuses on the one point where 
dogmatism and criticism must meet, which for each of them is the “same problem”: “the 
riddle of the world, the question of how the absolute could come out of itself and oppose 
to itself a world” (Schelling Letters 173-174). According to Schelling, God is not what is 
in question, for God is an idea that cannot be forgotten and that must be approached by 
theoretical reason, regardless of the timorous nature of Schelling’s interlocutor, to whom 
Schelling responds critically: “You say that theoretical reason is not able to comprehend 
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a God. So be it; but call it what you will–assumption, knowledge, belief–you cannot get 
rid of the idea of God” (Schelling Letters 158). Rather, the question is how is it that God 
reveals himself or what exactly the realm of the absolute is where both criticism and 
dogmatism must meet; the question is what does it mean if “the principle which they 
have so far presupposed, was nothing but a prolepsis” (Schelling Letters 175), or what 
Schelling, loosely quoting Jacobi, also calls systematic philosophy’s “original 
insuperable prejudices [Vorurteile]” (Schelling 176)? The Greek word prolepsis and the 
German word Vorurteile both have the same meaning of a preconception, a prejudice, or 
a prejudgment, which, for Schelling, means that the absolute is rather a site of 
prejudgment or decision from which “all the propositions which they [criticism and 
dogmatism] had put forth, thus far were propositions asserted absolutely, that is, without 
ground” (Schelling Letters 175-176). The Letters is, therefore, a speculative text that 
analyzes philosophy’s construction and deconstruction of the absolute, showing that the 
absolute is not a fixed principle but rather, as the highest principle of a system of 
criticism or dogmatism, has “only a subjective value as a basis of his [the philosopher’s] 
system, that is, . . . [it is] valid for him only inasmuch as he anticipated his own practical 
decision” (Schelling Letters 176). Therefore, the difference between dogmatism and 
criticism lies only in their approach towards the absolute, not in the concept of the 
absolute as such, which again emphasizes the mythologization that is required in order to 
articulate the narrative of the absolute as beginning. 
Schelling thus begins his analysis of the absolute by taking up Kant’s elaboration 
of the subject’s relation to the thing-in-itself in the Critique of Pure Reason. Criticism 
seeks the thing-in-itself not in an object but out of the freedom of the activity of the 
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subject. According to Schelling, the “subject is compelled to rise (through pro-
syllogisms) from conditional to unconditional judgments” (Schelling Letters 166), which 
means that, for criticism, there is in fact an “original absolute unity which precedes every 
synthesis”; criticism, therefore, “seeks what is not conditioned, and that the very striving 
which produces a synthesis demands an absolute thesis as goal of all philosophy” 
(Schelling Letters 166; my emphasis). This conception of the thing-in-itself, as the 
absolute synthesis without condition–that is a synthesis that ends in a thesis–leads 
Schelling to conceive of the Critique of Pure Reason as a system of systems. In other 
words, because the Critique begins from the point of the subject and not from some 
object that can come to be known empirically, the subject must show the process by 
which he or she has achieved an absolute thesis, providing a self-critical and self-aware 
method of grasping the absolute. Criticism, then, is more of an interpretive method that 
seeks out the absolute in the most consummate way; it “applies to both . . . the system of 
criticism as well as to that of dogmatism,” since Kant’s Critique favours “no system 
exclusively, but instead . . . [establishes] truly . . . a canon for all” systems, so that 
criticism does not disprove dogmatism but rather “has taught dogmatism how it can 
become dogmatism” in the first place (Schelling Letters 168-169). According to 
Schelling, systematic philosophy dies once it is confined to repeat itself over and over 
again in articulating itself in one particular system. The philosopher of criticism, 
however, does not feel this, for the philosopher of criticism is 
[t]he genuine philosopher [who] has never felt himself to be greater than when he 
has beheld an infinity of knowledge. The whole sublimity of his science has 
consisted in just this, that it would never be complete. He would become 
unbearable to himself the moment he came to believe that he had completed his 
system. That very moment he would cease to be creator and would be degraded 
to an instrument of his own creature. How much more unbearable he would find 
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the thought if somebody else should want to force such fetters on him!” 
(Schelling Letters 172) 
 
This is to say that criticism, for Schelling, is a system that must be able to explain all 
systems insofar as it shows how it becomes philosophy itself out of its own creation, not 
from something outside of it. The only thing that is posited for criticism is the subject in 
terms of the freedom of its activity to create in a similar way to how Schelling thinks 
Nature in the First Outline. Yet, because the subject, like nature, must be at once both the 
productivity and product, this conception of the subject also exposes the subject to its 
thinking and creating to the radical fact of the infinity of thinking itself, and not merely 
an “infinity of knowledge,” which ungrounds rather than unites the subject as a figure of 
philosophy.  
 But, what about the position of dogmatism? What is it that philosophers feel in 
relation to the “creature” which they have created? The philosophy of dogmatism, 
especially the passages which focus on Spinoza, supplies the other side of Schelling’s 
approach to systematic philosophy. In the Letters, Schelling does not privilege criticism 
over dogmatism, stating that they actually supplement each other, and “should 
necessarily exist side by side” (Schelling Letters 172). Schelling’s appreciation of 
criticism stems mostly from its function in inhibiting dogmatism’s unrestrained 
enthusiasm (Schwärmerei) for thought (Schelling Letters 179). Spinoza occupies 
Schelling’s interest precisely for this reason, not because “his concern in philosophy was 
only with the analytical propositions” (Schelling Letters 174), but because philosophy for 
Spinoza as a representative of “dogmatism” was nothing if not the realm of creative 
reason, of the imagination, and enthusiastic speculation. Dogmatism thus thinks 
absolutely, in the sense that the enthusiasm of its thought carries itself beyond its own 
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bounds, beyond the counsel of society that sought to impose limitations upon what must 
necessarily be unbound, unlimited, and unconditioned. However, because dogmatism 
shows that it is capable of creating synthetic figures merely by fiat, because it can state 
that God must be “because he is,” because “His existence and his essence [Wesen] must 
be identical,” it is 
[f]or that very reason every proof given by dogmatism is no proof in the proper 
sense, and the proposition there is a God is the most unproved, the most 
unprovable, the most groundless proposition–just as groundless as the supreme 
principle of criticism, I am!” (Schelling Letters 174)  
 
While criticism may teach dogmatism how it came to be, dogmatism shows criticism that 
its absolute principle is itself just as groundless, so that criticism “can be spared the 
reproach of fantastication [Schwärmerei] just as little as can dogmatism” (Schelling 
Letters 186). But, whereas Kant’s prejudgment decides that no actual knowledge of the 
absolute is possible, Spinoza is capable of this unbearable thought because he places 
“everything in existence [as] merely a modification of the same infinite. . . . [Where] 
there was no transition, no conflict, but only the demand that the finite strive to become 
identical with the infinite and to merge in the infinity of the absolute object” (Schelling 
Letters 178). While this ontological system may have seemed abhorrent to most of 
Spinoza’s contemporaries, Schelling describes Spinoza as someone who gave himself up 
to the happy “delusion” of this absolute state, for it represented the only means by which 
he could put an end to the contradiction of life, eliminating from existence the struggle to 
think of the subject’s external relation to the world outside of it. Spinoza spoke of this 
absolute state not only “cheerfully, but even with ecstasy” (Schelling Letters 183). It is 
this state of being infinitely within the absolute that Schelling will adopt for the Freedom 
essay, yet in a way that does not imitate Spinoza’s “quiet abandonment” (Schelling 
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Letters 157), for Schelling distinguishes himself from Spinoza by making contradiction 
immanent within God as a vital and real principle of the Freedom essay.  
 However, while the Philosophical Letters provides insight into how Schelling will 
take up dogmatism and criticism as binaries that supplement rather than exclude each 
other, the tenth and final letter’s analysis of Greek tragedy puts both of these philosophies 
under erasure and unravels their instrumentalization in the Freedom essay. Schelling 
writes in the opening of the tenth letter “that there is an objective power which threatens 
our freedom with annihilation,” and that we must “know” that we must “fight against it” 
by “exerting our whole freedom, and thus to go down” (Schelling Letters 192). For 
Schelling, Greek tragedy was the highest expression of the fated conflict between 
necessity and freedom. According to Schelling, Greek tragedy, since it figures a “mortal, 
destined by fate to become a malefactor,” shows the ultimate failure of human freedom: 
the malefactor who succumbed under the power of fate was punished, this tragic 
fact was the recognition of human freedom; it was the honor due to freedom. 
Greek tragedy honored human freedom, letting its hero fight against the superior 
power of fate. . . . As long as he is still free, he holds out against the power of 
destiny. As soon as he succumbs he ceases to be free. (Schelling Letters 192-193) 
 
The fact that the Letters ends with the knowledge that even “Greek tragedy,” as that 
which philosophy holds up as the highest expression in art, “could not reconcile freedom 
and failure” (Schelling Letters 193) must put the project of the Freedom essay into 
question. Because Schelling does not return to thinking human freedom as a failure that 
“fights against” fate, we can read the Freedom essay as simultaneously repressing and 
salvaging what was written in the Philosophical Letters. If human freedom is a 
fundamental failure, that the Freedom essay then awkwardly begins “with the correction 
of [the] essential concepts” of pantheism and idealism before the “genuine investigation” 
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into the essence of human freedom (Schelling Freedom 26), the obliqueness of the 
Freedom essay’s “Introduction” points towards the text’s anxiety over its own subject 
matter. Schelling, therefore, must repress the Philosophical Letters’s discovery of the 
failure of freedom in order to argue against those who say “the concept of system 
opposes the concept of freedom generally and in itself” in order to prove that “some kind 
of system must be present, at least in the divine understanding, with which freedom 
coexists” (Schelling Freedom 9). However, the writing of criticism and dogmatism is 
imbued with the freedom of failure essentially, and, as a result, the fate of the Freedom 
essay had always already been decided in the same way that any writing of human 
freedom is always decided “outside it and above all time” (Schelling Freedom 49). 
2. 3 The Pantheism Controversy 
 
The Freedom essay, rather than beginning with a clear and systematic 
investigation into the essence of human freedom, opens with a discussion of the 
pantheism controversy. As a result, the introduction begins in a rather oblique way: a 
detour we mean to probe further in this section. Because if we consider the Freedom 
essay alongside the Philosophical Letters, the investigation’s opening section on 
pantheism can be read in a way that sees Schelling returning to speculate upon 
dogmatism as a creative and passionate philosophical project that is complementary to 
criticism; for “it would be an error to think,” writes Schelling in the Freedom essay, “that 
pantheism has been abolished and destroyed by idealism” (Schelling Freedom 22-23). 
Rather pantheism, for Schelling, is not the Spinozistic pantheism that offended the 
intellectual sensibilities of most German Idealists, because the word pantheism opens up 
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for Schelling a space to re-configure and re-orient the philosophies of dogmatism and 
criticism that he worked out in the Letters.  
While Schelling’s prefatory evaluation of the pantheism controversy has been 
largely ignored, and relegated to something of local and particular historical concern, I 
argue that he uses the controversy over pantheism as a rhetorical space that allows him to 
introduce God as the guiding figure of the Freedom essay. However, this introduction of 
God, not as the God of theism but of pantheism, introduces problems into the system of 
freedom because God, as the essence of freedom, is now elaborated through existence 
rather than kept separate from it as a transcendental figure. As in the Philosophical 
Letters, Schelling remains critical of dogmatism and Spinoza’s surrender to the absolute, 
yet his enduring interest in pantheism9 also reveals it to be a necessary counterpoint to 
theorize a system of freedom. For Schelling, pantheism becomes a speculative word in 
the sense developed by Nancy, because through the word pantheism  “thought ‘finds’ its 
meaning,” its “speculative meaning” “right at the level” of the word” (Nancy Speculative 
Remark 55). Schelling’s writing of the word pantheism is an attempt at re-appropriating it 
from its common usage, for when Schelling wrote the Freedom essay, pantheism was still 
a word that signified an “entire [viewpoint]” which could be “described all at once” 
(Schelling Freedom 11). Pantheism had become forever separated from criticism, 
because Friedrich Jacobi, as a result of the pantheism controversy that emerged between 
him and Moses Mendelssohn in 1789, had laid out a “general attack on all forms of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Work on Schelling’s relationship to pantheism and especially to Spinoza and Leibniz remains few and far 
in between. For an account of the Pantheism controversy other than Schelling’s see Dale E. Snow’s 
Schelling and the End of Idealism, Andrew Bowie’s Schelling and Modern European Philosophy: An 
Introduction, as well as Dieter Henrich’s excellent Between Kant and Hegel: Lectures on German Idealism. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press (2008). 
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rationalism . . . [that] produced the extremely influential notion that all philosophical 
systems could be classified as one of two diametrically opposed types: realistic or 
idealistic” (Snow 15). As a result, pantheism had been negatively portrayed as a blind 
realism and had also become more of a label than a system, which Schelling criticizes: 
“[if] one has found the right label for a system, the rest falls into place for itself, and one 
is spared the effort of examining what is characteristic about it more meticulously” 
(Schelling Freedom 11). Pantheism had fallen victim to the dangers of philosophical 
language, “namely,” to quote Nancy, “the danger of enclosing speculativity within the 
univocal, within the unilaterality of a word” (Nancy Speculative Remark 69). For 
pantheism, as it was commonly understood, was synonymous with fatalism; however, 
Schelling writes that the fatalism attributed to pantheism is a “sense,” a feeling, or 
implication that is not essentially connected with it; for another sense can be attributed to 
it, one that “denotes nothing more than the doctrine of the immanence of things in God, 
[to which] every rational viewpoint in some sense must be drawn” (Schelling Freedom 
11). Pantheism, then, is rather a system that views the All as identical with the One or the 
universe as identical with God rather than a system where God determines the fate and 
being of those things contained within it.  
In this way, pantheism answers one half of the question that Schelling pointed to 
in the Philosophical Letters, that problem shared by dogmatism and criticism: why is 
there something rather than nothing? However, what separates the Freedom essay’s 
conception of pantheism from Spinoza’s is Schelling’s re-figuration of Jacobi’s opposing 
philosophical systems, conceiving them as necessary binaries that are thought through the 
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figure of the pantheist God by means of the narrative of theodicy. In what is one of 
Schelling’s most famous lines from the Freedom essay, he writes,  
Idealism, if it does not have as its basis a living realism, becomes just as empty 
and abstract a system as that of Leibniz, Spinoza, or any dogmatist. The entire 
new European philosophy since its beginning (with Descartes) has the common 
defect that nature is not available for it and that it lacks a living ground . . . . 
Idealism is the soul of philosophy; realism is the body; only both together can 
constitute a living whole. (Schelling Freedom 26) 
 
Here, Schelling conceives of a living realism as opposed to Spinoza, Leibniz, or Jacobi’s 
conception of a mechanistic realism, and therefore does not equate realism with 
dogmatism, but rather with criticism or nature in terms of the incessant production of 
itself from out of itself. Idealism, on the other hand, turns out to be dogmatic as it 
becomes an untouchable principle that makes the real “the ground and medium in which 
the former [idealism] makes itself real and takes on flesh and blood” (Schelling Freedom  
26). In the Freedom essay, then, it is the figure of the pantheistic God that is supposed to 
unify idealism and realism into a coherent systematic philosophy. However, while 
Spinoza makes use of the God of pantheism as a way to end the contradiction between 
subject and object, Schelling’s pantheism is written side by side with idealism in a similar 
way to the binary developed in the Philosophical Letters in order to form a contradiction 
that breathes life into the system of freedom. God “is in itself as based in itself, will, 
freedom” (Schelling Freedom 18), but he must also enter into existence with the real in 
order to realize himself as a synthetic unity rather than as he first finds himself in that 
initial contradiction that splits his identity into himself and his other, the ground of his 
existence.  
However, that initial contradiction cannot be unified simply by using the figure of 
the pantheist God because it requires a narrative supplement, that is, the figure of 
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theodicy. Theodicy is introduced as a narrative to explain the ideal’s emergence into 
existence with the real, and supplements the realist half of the Freedom essay, since 
theodicy is itself a narrative of God’s self-revelation that–so as to posit a beginning, a 
middle and an end–focuses on the problem of evil as what motivates God towards his 
unification. Rather than posit freedom in human terms as the failure of the struggle 
against the absolute, Schelling places freedom in the figural covenant between God and 
man as “the capacity for good and evil” (Schelling Freedom 23). In this sense, Schelling 
makes God into a real, existential being that is not wholly self-same because he is the 
possibility for good and evil and therefore the possibility for the narrative of theodicy. 
According to Schelling, Spinoza’s pantheist God was already complete, and “serves 
merely to determine the relationship of things to God but not what they [things, beings, 
man] may be, considered for themselves” (Freedom 16), whereas Schelling’s pantheism 
erases the fatalistic sense from the word “pantheism,” by writing the figure of the 
pantheist God as a subject in the process of its own becoming. Schelling thus redirects all 
of European philosophy back towards the God of pantheism and uses the figures of 
pantheism and theodicy or realism and idealism as a means of writing this new system of 
freedom. 
However, because Schelling turns God into a real and personal figure as opposed 
to a merely abstract principle, God is no longer a transcendent being and becomes a 
figure within the text’s economy of writing. Because he is personal, he is opened up to 
the problems of the finite world that must be worked out in order to close off the 
narrative of theodicy. The development of personality as a philosophical principle marks 
a turning point in Schelling’s works by investing the absolute into the singular parts of 
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the absolute system, linking its survival to the existence and progress of those individual 
articulations that support it. While it is true that Schelling had already expressed such a 
continuity between the whole and its products in the First Outline, he formulates the 
concept of personality together with the concept of pantheism and theodicy in the 
Freedom essay not only as a way of tying God to nature but as a way of further 
connecting God’s self-revelation to a covenant formed with man. A personal God, then, 
intensifies the interrelation between the absolute and the individuals that constitute it by 
exposing the more general system of pantheism to the problems God must face through 
the writing of his own self-revelation within the narrative of theodicy.  
But, because Schelling refuses the peaceful correlation between the absolute and 
man which Spinoza had theorized, and instead inserts the conflict between good and evil 
within God, man becomes that by which God’s revelation is assured or forfeited, and 
Schelling therefore re-inserts the problem of human freedom as failure into the Freedom 
essay. The figure of theodicy makes God dependent on man by turning man into the site 
of the conflict between good and evil, thus passing on the conflict that is within God on 
to man. This results in turning man into the figure by which the story is to be decided. 
The conflict can only take place in man, because God cannot be associated with evil 
except through his relationship to the realm of the ground and man, because what is 
“inseverable in God must therefore be severable in man–and this is the possibility of 
good and evil” (Schelling Freedom 33). Theodicy, therefore, functions in the same way 
as criticism, as it sets up a dialectic, or one of Schelling’s favorite words, a contradiction, 
for “without the contradiction of necessity and freedom,” writes Schelling, “not only 
philosophy but each higher willing of the spirit would sink into the death that is proper to 
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those sciences in which this contradiction has no application” (Schelling Freedom 10). 
However, while theodicy furnishes the contradiction by which the system of freedom 
may proceed, the pantheist God of dogmatism becomes no longer separate from this 
conflict. God, in the Freedom essay, as a result of the concept of personality, now has a 
personal stake in the conflict between good and evil in the ground of his existence. In 
other words, by making the conflict between good and evil a real conflict that must be 
resolved by man, Schelling has made the God of pantheism’s salvation dependent upon 
the fulfilled idea of a theodicean history; if the narrative of theodicy is not fulfilled, this 
reveals a fundamental gap in God’s own being since God is unable to authorize his own 
existence without the supplement of an other such as the figure of theodicy or the figure 
of man. This is to say that God’s authority is only real insofar as he imposes upon 
existence the responsibility to eliminate evil from his ground. However, since the ground 
is separate and distinct from God and yet contained within him as the essential realm of 
revelation, God becomes subject to the freedom of man to do either good or evil, which 
could mean the success or the failure of God’s revelation.  
This relationship raises the question, if God is absolutely free, should God also 
grant freedom to those things of creation? This anxiety was present even in the 
Philosophical Letters, since it was asked: would a higher being interfere with individual 
freedom or would the immanence of things in God be both a failure and a saving of 
freedom? However, this is only a superficial articulation of this anxiety; underneath, the 
conflict between good and evil raises the question: can God actually claim authorship 
over the history which he writes for himself and of which he is a part? Can God keep his 
creation within bounds and not become an instrument of his own creature? For, if we read 
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against the grain, what the Freedom essay demonstrates is the illusion of the authority 
gained through positing God and the ground within a theodicy. What results, to borrow 
from Žižek’s work on Schelling, is not unlike 
[t]he gap exemplified by the ancient Aztec priest who organizes human sacrifices 
to ensure the rising of the sun, who is alarmed by the seemingly "irrational" 
prospect that the most obvious thing will not happen[.] And is not the same 
gesture of freely asserting the inevitable constitutive of the position of a Master? 
By means of his "Yes!" a Master merely "dots the i's," attests the unavoidable–he 
acts as if he has a choice where effectively there is none. (For that reason, there is 
unavoidably something inherently asinine involved in the position of a Master: a 
Master's main role is to state the obvious). (Žižek“Abyss of Freedom” 70) 
 
Existence is already apparent, and what Žižek points out is the meaningless abyss that 
stands behind the concept of authority. God may realize existence in the text, but 
obviously existence must necessarily come to pass. The sublime power of the Word that 
ushers in creation in an opening of the limitless reaches of existence turns out to be 
nothing but God gesturing at what passes before him and quite possibly beyond him.  
2. 4 The Evil that Lies Beneath 
 
What makes Schelling such an interesting thinker is specifically the auto-
deconstructive personality of his texts, for the authority of the Freedom essay and The 
Ages is undermined specifically by the figures of God and the ground that, here in the 
Freedom essay, the text deploys in order to establish God’s authority over his revelation. 
In the Freedom essay, in order to avoid the abyss of the past, Schelling theorizes, by 
means of what he calls the law of identity and the law of the ground, a God who is able to 
contain within himself the ground for his own self-manifestation. Yet, according to the 
law of identity and the meaning of the copula, the identity of God is split into two 
opposing and different beings: God as he Himself and God as ground of his own 
existence. In this sense, saying, ‘God is ground,’ is like saying ‘the body is blue.’ To say 
	  	  
60 
that one is the other does not mean that they are the same according to Schelling’s logic, 
for the statement differentiates “subject and object as what precedes and what follows 
(antecedens et consequens)” (Schelling Freedom 14). From this, Schelling draws upon a 
second law titled the law of the ground (Gesetz des Grundes): “Therefore, the eternal 
must also be a ground immediately and as it is in itself. That of which the eternal is a 
ground through its being is in this respect dependent and, from the point of view of 
immanence, also something contained within the eternal” (Freedom 17; my emphasis). 
And although Schelling qualifies the word ‘dependent’ so that we do not misconstrue it to 
mean that something dependent is determined, we as readers are confronted with the 
impossible paradox of God’s self-dependence–because independence does not 
appropriately convey the split in God’s identity–on something that is at once contained 
within him but “is not He Himself” (Schelling Freedom 28). 
The figures of God and the ground thus bring up the question of firstness and 
secondness, since the ground of God’s existence must in fact exist in a sense before God 
so that God may come to be. This problem of whether God succeeds the ground or 
whether it is the other way around had also been a problem for Schelling when he wrote 
the System of Transcendental Idealism. There, while in the process of the development of 
absolute identity, Schelling necessarily had to admit a past that preceded consciousness 
and which ultimately permits its realization. In his introduction to the System, Michael 
Vater argues that the past of the objective world–the unconscious that opposes the 
conscious–problematizes the primacy and authority of absolute consciousness, insofar as 
the objective world must in some way precede the subject. Absolute consciousness, 
although it includes the unconscious in the realm of the subjective as what is intuitively 
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objective, always encounters something that resists consciousness as a fact that precedes 
and is always beyond the powers of the conscious understanding. Although the 
unconscious in the System does not assume the same kind of psychological affect that 
comes up in the Freedom essay and the 1815 version of The Ages of the World, the past 
does always appear to complicate any understanding of temporality, firstness and 
secondness, and hence complicates the place of authority in each text in which it is 
articulated. 
 It is this traumatic affect of the past that leads to the concept of the ground, not as 
something that can be subsumed under the authority of God, but in terms of an 
ungrounded figure that deconstructs God from within. Schelling writes that the ground 
“is nature–in God, a being indeed inseparable, yet still distinct from him” (Schelling 
Freedom 27) that does in fact “[precede] him in existence” (Schelling Freedom 28). 
Another distinguishing factor that separates Schelling’s pantheism from Spinoza’s is 
Spinoza’s “mechanistic view of nature” (Schelling Freedom 20). Drawing largely from 
the First Outline, Schelling attributes to the ground the “dynamic notion of nature” 
(Schelling Freedom 20), and therefore places within it the dynamism and productivity 
that escapes the bounds imposed by God’s authority, making the ground as nature a 
deconstructive rather than constructive figure. 
Such an identity of the product and the productivity in the original conception of 
Nature is expressed by the ordinary view of Nature as a whole, which is at once 
the cause and effect of itself, and is in its duplicity (which runs through all 
phenomena) again identical. (First Outline 202) 
 
But here Schelling inverts and suppresses the primacy of the ground in favor of the 
primacy of God “in so far as the ground, even as such, could not exist if God did not exist 
actu” (Schelling Freedom 28). The difference, then, between nature in the First Outline 
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compared to the Freedom essay is clearly expressed in the way Schelling figures nature 
as dependent on something outside of it, namely God; for in the 1809 Freedom essay, the 
authority of God limits nature: 
The first effect of the understanding in nature is the division of forces, since only 
thus can understanding unfold the unity that is unconsciously but necessarily 
immanent in nature as in a seed, just as in man the light enters into the dark 
yearning to create something so that in the chaotic jumble of thoughts, all hanging 
together, but each hindering the other from emerging, thoughts divide themselves 
from each other, and now the unity hidden in the ground and containing all raises 
itself up . . . . Because, namely, this being (of primordial nature) is nothing else 
than the eternal ground for the existence of God. (Schelling Freedom 30) 
 
In the Freedom essay, Schelling tries to write nature in relation to God as merely the 
“yearning the eternal One feels to give birth to itself” (Schelling Freedom 28); however 
because nature is divested of the unconditioned and absolute force attributed to it in the 
First Outline, this articulation of nature as merely a yearning rather than as a site of its 
own productivity must be put under erasure. Nature’s sudden abandonment to the 
authority of God seems out of place, and is rather a means to answer a question that is 
carried over from the First Outline: how does nature inhibit its absolute productivity? 
David Farrell Krell notes that this problem plagued not only Schelling but the entire 
generation of philosophers after Kant; “[t]he bedeviling problem for Schelling… is how 
infinite activity could ever have submitted to such compulsion to reproduction or to a 
condition or determination of any kind–above all, the compulsion of inhibition 
(Hemmung)” (Krell Tragic Absolute 48). 
 But, while to Krell nature’s inhibition in the First Outline appears arbitrary, 
Schelling accounts for nature’s inhibition in the Freedom essay by subordinating it to the 
primacy of God, turning nature into the voice of God’s “effeminate lamentations” 
(Schelling Freedom 29). And yet this insoluble problem of inhibition takes on staggering 
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new dimensions in the Freedom essay, for while gender was not really at issue in the 
philosophy of nature, nature in the Freedom essay is defined clearly as the feminine half 
of God that must suffer under a male authority. Schelling refers to God as ‘himself’ and 
as both ‘father’ and ‘son,’ but it is only by means of a male dominion over the dark, 
feminine ground that God can write his own revelation. Schelling inverts and suppresses 
the primacy of the ground in exchange for the primacy of God, and therefore makes the 
feminine into that which cannot exist without its masculine authority. But, if darkness is 
the bearer of light, and “[a]ll birth is birth from darkness into light” (Schelling Freedom 
29), how is it that nature is subordinate to God? Is it because, as Krell notes, philosophy 
“is here made to suffer emasculation” (Krell Tragic Absolute 76)? There is an uncanny 
interdependence that connects God to the ground in the Freedom essay because it is not 
as if God can simply extricate itself from and transcend above the ground; without it, as 
was made clear above, idealism cannot become the true philosophy since it needs its 
living ground. But the subordination of the feminine to the masculine is a false relation 
imposed upon nature by the narrative of theodicy. For if the ground is separate and if 
“[man] is formed in the maternal body” (Schelling Freedom 29), then the feminine body 
also becomes representative of a dissent and an anxiety for the male figure of God, as 
Krell has pointed out,  
When idealism fails to take on flesh and blood in the womb of realism, its high 
spirits and presumed high-mindedness culminate in a Selbstzerfleischung [self-
mutilation or self-destruction] that the idealist wanted to rule out in the first 
place–as though there were already in idealism, quite in spite of its conception of 
itself, a Fleisch susceptible to mutilation. (Krell Tragic Absolute 77) 
 
The ground, then, is made into God’s ‘foot-stool’ “because God perceived the will of the 
ground as the will for his revelation and . . . recognized that a ground independent from 
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him (as spirit) would have to be the ground for his existence” (Schelling Freedom 45). 
But, this is in fact not a benevolent relation, for when God enters into relation with the 
ground of his existence, to borrow from Lord Byron’s Cain, God “Sit[s] on his vast and 
solitary throne–/ Creating worlds, to make eternity/ Less burdensome to his immense 
existence/ And unparticipated solitude” (Byron 1. 1. 148-151). This is the dark reality 
that taints the love that God holds towards his own creation, and is the madness behind 
the self’s splitting itself in two in order to grasp its own self-sameness that is in reality 
not there. 
 Indeed, insofar as Schelling writes the ground in order to serve the figure of 
theodicy as the possibility for the revelation of God, this same writing is complicated in 
its instrumentalization of the ground for the egotistical purposes of God’s self-revelation. 
Because Schelling assigns the ground its own particular freedom that resists the 
‘benevolent guidance’ of eternal freedom, the ground is a deconstructive figure rather 
than subordinate figure within the regulative and linear narrative of theodicy and 
revelation. The eternal will of the ground differs from the eternal will of God in its ability 
to change course and to realize and reveal itself according to its own will by actively and 
naturally resisting God’s will. Just as God becomes the eternal principle of freedom by 
means of the law of identity and the law of the ground, so too does the ground’s 
particular freedom. Interestingly, the original purpose of these two laws was to keep God 
separate from the ground and yet also to incorporate it into God as the means by which 
God writes out the history of his own revelation. Yet the writing of theodicy, which 
presents God as the authority by which the text smoothly progresses, is not able to 
contain its dis-ease with what erupts in the metaphorical language of the ground. 
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Theodicy represents, therefore, an instance of the text’s attempt at repressing the auto-
immunity of its writing. In other words, the benevolence of God is an anxious articulation 
that tries to repress the willful anarchy of the ground of God’s existence; what was 
supposed to legitimate the authority of God as the writer of history ends up putting the 
concept of authority under erasure, which shows the arbitrariness of authority as merely 
an articulation rather than a grounded principle to which God has recourse. In a passage 
that is primarily meant to buttress Schelling’s law of the ground, Schelling furthermore 
uses a lurid figure, that of the eye, which deconstructs the desired authority that the law 
of the ground is meant to re-inscribe.  
An individual body part, like the eye is only possible within the whole of an 
organism; nonetheless, it has its own life for itself, indeed, its own kind of 
freedom, which it obviously proves through the disease of which it is capable. 
Were that which is contained in another not itself alive, then there would be 
containment without some thing being contained, that is, nothing would be 
contained…. God is not a god of the dead but of the living. (Schelling Freedom 
18) 
 
In this sense, the ground, as that which is contained within the concept of God, is 
absolutely alive in two ways: firstly for God, and secondly for itself. Thus, on the one 
hand, the ground is already subjugated under God’s eternal will and cannot decide how to 
actualize its freedom, while, on the other, it is capable of resisting its instrumentalization 
by virtue of falling sick. The metaphors of life and organicism perform the same kind of 
resistance that the eye performs in relation to the body which is representative of the 
particular will’s resistance, its fight, against the universal will that seeks to exploit it in 
order to write the history of theodicy. 
In the section on the deduction of the possibility of evil, Schelling writes the 
triumph of good as the figure of light in order to subordinate and repress evil as the figure 
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of darkness, but this in fact also opens up new possibilities of dissent within the ground. 
The evil principle is figured as the self-will of the ground that is obsessed with its own 
particular selfhood. Opposed to the ground’s pure egoity is the figure of good or of light, 
that is, the universal will of the understanding. The only possible way these opposing 
figures can come into existence is through man as articulated within an eschatological 
and typological rhetoric that figures man as the means by which theodicy can be written 
out and completed. It is in man that the conflict of good and evil meet in their most real 
opposition and will eventually, according to Schelling, transform into what is called the 
principle of spirit. Yet, because this principle emerges out of the opposition between light 
and dark that are themselves figures within the theodicean narrative, so too is spirit itself 
a figure through which the text can write the narrative of theodicy.  
Spirit, therefore, is deployed in order to bring about the final unity of “light and 
darkness (vowel and consonant)” (Schelling Freedom 32). However, this final unity, or 
what Schelling calls ‘consonance,’ is always a becoming spirit, for “[s]elfhood as such is 
spirit”; but because “man is spirit as a selfish [selbstsich], particular being (separated 
from God),” the spirit of man can potentially become a figure of dissonance as well as 
consonance (Schelling Freedom 33). The gap that separates the particular human from 
God does not negate a particular personality that is itself different from God, because, 
according to the logic of the eschatology, this particular personality is a becoming spirit; 
in other words, the particular spirits are what make up God’s self-revelation into the 
unified principle of spirit. Spirit is thus figured as “raised from the creaturely into what is 
above the creaturely” and what is “rather above and outside of all nature” (Schelling 
Freedom 33). But, as is the case with the eye that falls sick, the selfish figure of the 
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ground does not necessarily need to follow the guidance and understanding of the figure 
of light; indeed, selfhood can choose its own vectors of possibility “if it is in fact not the 
spirit of eternal love–selfhood can separate itself from the light; or self-will can strive to 
be as a particular will that which it only is, in so far as it remains in the centrum” of the 
ground (Schelling Freedom 33). The personality of the particular self-will, then, is 
capable of dissent and dissolution, and can potentially overturn the direction and 
magnitude of the particular in relation to the universal.  
The narrative of theodicy is therefore opposed to the marginalized narrative of the 
ground, a narrative characterized by a persistence of “an indignant host of desires and 
appetites” as well as a “life… which, though individual, is, however, false, a life of 
mendacity, a growth of restlessness and decay”; however, the life of the ground actually 
becomes a speculative and experimental articulation within the regulative and linear 
narrative of the text’s theodicy, insofar as the ground’s “most fitting comparison here is 
offered by disease which, as the disorder having arisen in nature through the misuse of 
freedom, is the true counterpart of evil or sin” (Schelling Freedom 34). But because 
disease itself is a freedom that allows for the individual part ‘such as the eye’ to be 
independent of the body and therefore to be for itself, the life of the ground as a disease, 
decay, and restlessness becomes a being within God that asserts a particular freedom in 
opposition to the freedom of God. In this sense, as William Blake said of John Milton, 
Schelling has perhaps unknowingly become part ‘of the devil’s party,’ for, as Schelling 
writes of the devil, “according to the Christian point of view, [the devil] was not the most 
limited creature, but rather the least limited one” (Schelling Freedom 36). In this sense, 
the metaphorical language used to describe evil, disease, and the life of the ground 
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figures them as potentially too unruly for the language of theodicy, since the 
metaphorical inscription of theodicy within the text presents an unlimited and an 
unbounded life that is not God's. Instead, these metaphors open a speculative reading of 
evil as a voice of dissent against God’s arbitrary authority; evil is a subtext, or a 
marginalized point of view, that was unjustly exploited in order to run the economy of 
theodicy. Consequently, theodicy appears as a deceptive narration that cannot integrate or 
express God’s relationship with its ground except in the language of a conflict. Instead of 
instilling faith in the figure of God as a redemptive transcendental signifier, the figuration 
of the ground must put the authority of God under erasure, begging more questions than it 
answers.  
 The concept of ground, therefore, paradoxically becomes fundamental to 
establishing the existence of God, but, at the same time, has the undeniable potential to 
unground and unravel God’s authorial position. As Schelling writes, 
This concept arises from the relation of the whole to the individual, from unity to 
multiplicity, or however one wants to express it. The positive is always the whole 
or unity; that which opposes unity is severing of the whole, disharmony, ataxia of 
forces. The same elements are in the severed whole that were in the cohesive 
whole; that which is material in both is the same (from this perspective, evil is not 
more limited or worse than the good), but the formal aspect of the two is totally 
different, though this formal aspect still comes precisely from the essence or the 
positive itself. (Schelling Freedom 38) 
 
What is most unsettling about God’s relationship to its ground is not simply that the 
ground deconstructs God’s authority, but that the elements which are in the whole that is 
disrupted are the same as those in the whole that tries to maintain the semblance of 
cohesion. What distinguishes the two is their formal aspect, that is, how both take from 
the same source but distort the source into different forms, alienating God from his own 
manifestations, and showing exactly what it was that scared Spinoza so much about the 
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objective world that opposed and disfigured the integrity of the figure of God. In this 
sense, God actually provides the means of its own deconstruction. Is it not this absurd 
notion of God’s own construction/deconstruction that Schelling seems to imply by the 
concept of the indivisible remainder, “the incomprehensible base of reality in things… 
that which with the greatest exertion cannot be resolved in understanding but rather 
remains eternally in the ground” (Schelling Freedom 29)? For God cannot come into 
existence without the ground coming into existence equally for itself, as “[g]ood without 
active selfhood is inactive good…. Only selfhood that has been overcome, thus brought 
back from activity to potentiality, is the good” (Schelling Freedom 63). On the other 
hand, since “in God there is an independent ground of reality and, hence, two equally 
eternal beginnings of self-revelation” (Schelling Freedom 59), it becomes not so much a 
matter of good overcoming selfhood, since revelation “must be considered in regard to 
his [God’s] freedom in relation to both [good and evil]” (Schelling ibid.). God is not 
selfsame but is split in the same way the text is actually writing out two eternally 
different narratives, the narrative of the ground, which is “the yearning of the One to give 
birth to itself,” but also the figure of the deconstruction of God’s benevolence and 
arbitrary authority and existence; the second narrative is the narrative of theodicy, of 
God, as the will of understanding, “whereby the word is spoken out into nature and 
through which God first makes himself personal” (Schelling ibid.).  
To read the Freedom essay against the grain is to disclose the text as already at 
work consuming and entangling its principles from the beginning. Although the 
irreducible remainder is what runs underneath existence as the roiling darkness that 
thrives on its forsaken condition, it is equally what gives birth to light, and indeed, the 
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claim that the ground submits to God’s authority appears untenable and must be put 
under erasure. For the ground does not appear to submit to God but rather God submits to 
the ground, therefore becoming an instrument of his own creature. Theodicy, thus, is used 
to repress the deconstructive potential of the Freedom essay through the writing and 
rhetoric it uses to ascribe a beginning, middle, and end to a text that is fundamentally 
obsessed with explaining how temporality ever comes to be in the first place. The 
repression, however, is a secondary repression, insofar as it is a conscious and specific 
psychical act that tries to occlude something from the text’s narrative, and yet remains 
ultimately unsuccessful. By using revelation and theodicy as metaphors for time, in the 
words of Carol Jacobs, to “[generate] out of a series of repetitions… the illusion of 
sequence or linear temporal order” (Jacobs 107), Schelling tries to use God’s history in 
order to achieve the notion of a fully actualized God and hence a completely realized 
system of freedom. Consequently, Schelling falls victim to his own precautions, 
prioritizing univocality above the plurality of speculative language. Yet, while the text 
may avoid the “quiet abandonment” of Spinoza’s surrender to the absolute, the Freedom 
essay discloses a God whose whole body is not selfsame and is always anxious about its 
own bodily (de)composition and (dys)functionality by trying to repress the productive 
and creative ground of its existence. What Schelling’s writing of theodicy as the history 
of God shows is not a composite, linear, or unified God but rather a figure that is subject 
to a history that splits apart, which opens up an abyssal gap that separates the ideal from 
its real other, and puts in to question the continuity which Schelling had initially pleaded 
for in the preface to the Freedom essay. Therefore, regardless of the figures that Schelling 
resorts to–be it God, pantheism, or theodicy–in order to legitimate and seal this continuity 
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and linear development of freedom away from the possibility of its own deconstruction, a 
system of freedom is always subject to the auto-immunity of its writing, to its own 
ungroundedness, and to its failure. 
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The Disfigured God 
3. 1 Introduction 
 
This third chapter begins our analysis of Schelling’s unpublished magnum opus, 
The Ages of the World. While this chapter will focus on Schelling’s relationship to Jacob 
Boehme and how this lends itself to a reading of the Ages as a writing of Gnosticism (i.e. 
as the writing of knowledge as esotericism), the fourth and final chapter will continue this 
investigation into the 1815 version of The Ages of The World with a deconstructive 
reading of the Godhead as the figure which brings about the traumatic writing of the text, 
a site that represents the necessary relationship between writing and repression. For now, 
this chapter’s focus on Schelling’s relationship to Boehme, as a representative of the 
diversity and heretical nature of Gnostic writing and not as a visionary mystic of 
monotheism, serves as a lens to read Schelling’s text as a writing of madness as well as a 
writing of knowledge. As the introduction to each version of the Ages opens with a 
conception of temporality as representable and knowable, wherein the “past is known, the 
present is discerned, the future is intimated” (Schelling Ages xxxv), this knowledge 
signals to us, as readers, that the project of the Ages can be read as a mythopoeic writing 
of God’s self-revelation towards the achievement of absolute knowledge. I argue that the 
Ages, in its projected narrative of God in the three ages of past, present, and future, takes 
part in “[one] of the chief characteristics of Gnosticism . . . [that is,] in the construction of 
elaborate myths through which revealed gnosis is transmitted” (Pearson 14); but because 
this mythopoeic writing can never overcome the writing of the book of the past, the Ages 
puts the activity of mythologization under erasure.  
If we turn to the writings of Jacob Boehme, it becomes evident that Schelling 
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metaleptically transposes Boehme’s Gnostic writing and theosophical figures into the 
realm of idealist philosophy. The writings of Boehme, despite their theological devotion, 
represent a “hinge,” a term borrowed from Derrida in Resistances of Psychoanalysis10, 
through which Schelling can work through the problems of German Idealism and 
Romanticism, taking up Gnosticism as a way to think more dangerously and write more 
experimentally. In this sense, Boehme’s gnostic writings represent a site of intellectual 
ferment, or a heresy in the true sense of the word as the “choice” to oppose authority, a 
heresy that challenges orthodox Christian writings as representative of the order of 
established reason. By reading Boehme along with the writings of Georges Bataille, I 
also argue that Gnostic writing or the writing of knowledge tries to impose a “silence,” in 
the words of Derrida, upon the writing of madness; Gnostic writing writes itself in order 
to evade the problems of darkness and evil. The writing of knowledge, to quote from 
Derrida, as a “discourse of command . . . insists upon being sheltered, and . . . also insists 
upon providing itself with protective barriers against madness” (Derrida “Cogito” 38). 
However, in order to write the history of knowledge, Gnosticism, as will be shown, must 
also write its discordant counterpoint. While the Freedom essay represents a first instance 
of Schelling’s writing of Gnosticism insofar as it also puts up barriers to write a more 
linear and composed progression towards knowledge, the Ages disfigures this writing as 
it deconstructs the narrative’s progress towards gnosis through its simultaneous writing of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  “Why a charnière? This word can be taken in the technical or anatomical sense of a central or cardinal 
articulation, a hinge pin (cardo) or pivot. A charnière or hinge is an axial device that enables the circuit, the 
trope, or the movement, of rotation. ... This double articulation, this double movement or alternation 
between opening and closing that is assured by the workings of a hinge, this coming and going, indeed 
this fort/da of a pendulum (pendule) or balance (balancier) – that is what Freud means to Foucault. ... There 
will always be this interminable, alternating movement that successively opens and closes, draws near and 
distances, rejects and accepts, excludes and includes, disqualifies and legitimates, masters and liberates. ... 
Freud as the doorman of the today, the holder of the keys, of those that open as well as those that close the 
door, ... stands guard and ushers in. Alternatively or simultaneously, he closes one epoch and opens 
another" (Derrida Resistances 78-9). 
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the history of madness. Gnosticism, then, cannot silence its other; rather Boehme’s and 
Schelling’s texts open up a way of reading Gnosticism not as a blind and naïve activity 
that surrenders to God’s omniscience and omnipotence, but as an unresolved and infinite 
writing of knowledge that fundamentally cannot be written without its heretical Other: 
the writing of madness. 
Yet while Schelling’s writing of Gnosticism does adopt figures and narratives 
from Boehme’s texts, his texts are distinct insofar as he pathologizes the history of 
knowledge by also writing out the history of madness as knowledge’s complementary 
antithesis. Since “nothing great can be accomplished,” writes Schelling in the 1815 
version of the Ages, “without a constant solicitation of madness, which should always be 
overcome, but should never be utterly lacking” (Schelling Ages 103), this writing 
presents a radical reinterpretation of Gnosticism’s deployment of the opposition between 
reason and madness. The traditional Gnostic opposition is “expressed in terms of a tragic 
split in the divine world that results in the genesis of the lower beings responsible for the 
cosmos” (Pearson 13), which arises, in the words of David Brakke, from the “downward 
movement of the divine” (often called Wisdom) into the realm of fate” in order “to 
recover [God’s] lost divine energy” (Brakke 20). This downward movement of the divine 
into materiality, this split between a higher and a lower realm of existence, also provides 
Gnosticism with a rationale for God’s entrance into history, turning it into the means by 
which God and man can resolve this tragic split. The main difference between Boehme 
and Schelling, then, is that Boehme successfully represses–insofar as it is successful in 
name only–God’s dark ground and the anarchy of evil contained within it in order to 
fulfill a theological history, making Boehme much more traditionally Gnostic than 
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Schelling. It is worth noting that Boehme’s opposition between reason and madness, 
good and evil, the will of God and the craving of his dark non-ground represents a crude 
model of dialectical thought, insofar as it prefigures the way Schelling makes use of 
contradiction, using it as fundamental principle that supplies the vital animation of his 
systematic philosophy and thought in general. However, Schelling’s writing of madness 
does not rely upon Boehme’s dialectical articulation between reason and madness in the 
same way. Rather, it shows that madness is not something that can be so easily overcome, 
as the order of madness not only resists but contains within it the potential to absolutely 
disrupt the order of knowledge that the Ages tries to write. 
3. 2 Gnosticism and the Choice of Heretical Writing 
 
Although Boehme’s Gnosticism is more traditional, if we read his writing against 
the grain, his texts all write of a figure of the dark non-ground, which will be taken up by 
Schelling, first in the Freedom essay and then in the Ages, as the ungrounded figure of 
the first nature. Gnosticism, in the potential and dormant expression of its discordant 
ground, thus appears as a profoundly radical activity, insofar as its writing is always 
potentially dangerous to its own integrity as well as to orthodox Christian writing as an 
authoritative or dogmatic system of belief. In other words, Gnosticism takes on the 
position of the order of madness which opposes the authority of orthodox Christianity’s 
order of knowledge. Indeed, Gnosticism has for a long time been considered a deranged 
or “parasitic discourse” (O’Regan 18) that “[turns] Christianity on its head,” as Brakke 
writes, not because of its apostasy but because of its radical faith in a privileged insight 
into the nature of God; “they [the Gnostics],” Brakke continues, “thought they were 
teaching true Christianity, and they severely criticized other Christians as hopelessly 
	  	  
76 
deceived” (Brakke 2). Gnosticism, as a heretical writing of the divine, provides an 
internal unworking of orthodox writing as it is at once enthusiastic and critical, in the 
words of Schelling, since its approach towards the absolute shows how it can deconstruct 
from within dogmatism’s quiet surrender to God. In this way, Gnosticism is the 
concealed, hidden writing that lies subjacent under the writing of orthodox Christianity, 
whose belief in salvation is put under erasure by the heretical history that sees the divine 
not as something complete in itself, but as something in the process of its own becoming, 
and something that constantly works towards unifying the contradiction brought forth 
from the creation of his dual existence. 
But before we turn to Boehme’s writing, Boehme the man provides us with plenty 
of evidence of Gnosticism as a disruptive and intellectually varied practice that stands in 
opposition to the singular and unified discourse of orthodox Christianity. Until the middle 
of the twentieth century, Jacob Boehme (also written as Jakob Böhme or Jakob Behmen) 
had been read as a visionary mystic whose writings were directly the result of a miracle 
of illumination that occurred in 1600, which, according to his biographers, supposedly 
granted Boehme a prophetic insight. The way that Boehme’s writings were characterized 
according to a privileged insight into the nature of God rather than in terms of the range 
of his reading had a significant effect on the readings of Boehme up until the 20th 
century; according to Robert F. Brown, whose book The Later Philosophy of Schelling 
investigates the relationship between Boehme and Schelling, “no genuinely critical 
biography was published until 1924” (Brown 33), and thus his visionary power was either 
vehemently defended by his biographers or was left unquestioned. More recently, 
dispelling the myth surrounding Boehme’s moment of illumination, Andrew Weeks 
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writes 
Boehme’s illumination, though surely a singularly transforming and inspiring 
experience, should not be thought of as fundamentally distinct from other 
processes of inspiration. The notion that his writings were records of ecstatic 
visions not only contributes almost nothing to their interpretation, it is detrimental 
to our understanding of the writer in the cultural context of his times. (Weeks 30) 
Along with Robert F. Brown, works by Andrew Weeks and Cyril O’Regan have all tried 
to rehabilitate Boehme by critically reading him as a writer who was a representative of 
the intellectual environment of pansophism–a pedagogical and educational movement 
that promoted the achievement of a universal wisdom of man and the world–during the 
seventeenth-century, rather than as a singular figure whose writings magically appeared 
out of the vacuum of divine inspiration. However, Boehme’s pansophism is different 
insofar as his pansophistic wisdom is rather an omniscience stemming from an 
enveloping knowledge of nature and Scripture. O’Regan writes: “Pansophism suggests 
more than an inclusive aggregate of particulars. . . . For Boehme, the systematic character 
of reality is guaranteed by a narrative suggested by Scripture, but completed only in a 
pneumatic or sophiological state that transcends Scripture” (O’Regan 107). Therefore, 
those readings which emphasize the illuminative aspect of Boehme’s biographical life 
and its influence on his writings have also had repercussions on the way that Boehme 
may be read as a precursor to figures in German Idealism such as Schelling. This 
simplified representation of Boehme belies the diversity and interdisciplinarity of his 
thought, which also conceals the more gnostic and pansophistic tendencies that appear in 
his writing. In this way, Boehme, like Schelling, in fact read widely in a variety of 
different fields, combining them, like his contemporaries, in order to achieve a pansophic 
vision of the world. 
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Boehme was indeed representative of a much more daring intellectual age, to 
quote from Andrew Weeks, since “[around] 1600, the search for synthesis was [also] 
pursued above all by the loose convention of pansophic researchers at the court of 
Rudolph II in Prague” (Weeks 49). In a certain way, this convention represented an early 
attempt at interdisciplinary studies, drawing on “men of various disciplines, of differing 
confessions and nationalities,” all in the pursuit “of construing the orders of the world” 
(Weeks 49). Weeks continues, “[t]hey did so by researching nature and Scripture. Their 
efforts encompassed religion, science, law, and the arts” (Weeks 49). It appears that 
previous readings of Boehme, which generally saw him alongside his forerunner 
Paracelsus, did not consider other attempts at pansophism which were taking place at that 
time such as those undertaken by Giordano Bruno in Prague, Robert Fludd, Galileo, and 
the astronomer Johannes Kepler, which indicate that all of these thinkers “were in reality 
part of a broader current, with more distant sources” than earlier biographers recognized 
(Weeks 49). Weeks states that there are clear indications that Boehme’s writings adapt or 
make use of a number of different influences besides those of Paracelsus, including 
references to Platonic Ideas, Hermetic magic, as well as evidence of the “Renaissance 
syncretism of Ficino and Pico [that] also blended elements of Jewish Kabbalah with 
Christian currents of speculation” (Weeks 49). The blindness of Boehme’s earlier 
biographers had led readers to believe that he was uneducated in these matters, and 
attributed to him a more orthodox writing which fails to grasp the diversity of Gnostic 
writing; but, Robert F. Brown states, “[a]lthough lacking the classical and formal training 
of a professional philosopher, he [Boehme] nevertheless read widely in the alchemical, 
mystical, and religious literature of his day” (Brown 33-34). Contrary to previous 
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readings, Boehme in fact “came to embrace the belief that ancient knowledge was 
resurfacing,” and, therefore, blended ancient with modern conceptions of the universe “in 
order to reinforce and clarify the Christian articles of faith” (Weeks 50). It is thus that 
Boehme, according to Andrew Weeks, was led to ask questions that were not 
traditionally theological, but, in the words of Cyril O’Regan, metaleptically transformed 
numerous areas of thought and disciplines in order to express his thoughts in opposition 
to traditional theology on what exactly was the unfathomable “locus of the world.” For 
[t]he doctrinal either/or was the shibboleth of partisan divisiveness and bitter 
polarization. But what if the sun were not in an upper heaven, but rather at the 
very center of the created world? What if the solar or stellar forces were 
themselves both material and divine? And what if the dualism which knew no 
middle ground between matter and spirit (between the element or body, and the 
spirit, sign, meaning, or thought) rested on a false dichotomy, false because 
external nature and human nature were in either case triadically structured as 
aspects of the ubiquitous Triune God? (Weeks 50-51) 
 
All of the above questions position Boehme thus as representative of “a privileged 
site of the return of a Gnostic modality of thought in modernity” (O’Regan 2). 
Gnosticism, in the way that we are reading it, comes from the Greek adjective gnostikos, 
which applies “to capacities, intellectual activities, or mental operations” wherein a 
“gnostic activity or capacity was one that led to or supplied gnosis, that is knowledge that 
was not merely practical but theoretical, immediate, and intuitive” (Brakke 30). As an 
activity that was equally dependent on its writing, Gnosticism was criticized early on by 
Irenaeus of Lyons in 160 CE as being “extremely diverse and yet somehow all the same” 
(Brakke 29). Irenaeus’s criticism, as a defense coming from an orthodox Christian 
perspective, ironically shows the lack of diversity and rigidity of orthodox Christianity, 
and, in a sense, puts its authority under erasure; when held up to the wildly speculative 
potential of Gnosticism as a writing that continuously questions its own history, the 
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orthodox narrative of Christianity becomes disfigured by Gnosticism’s re-figuration of 
itself through not one but multiply divergent narratives. It is this metaleptical quality, a 
term borrowed from Cyril O’Regan, of Gnosticism as a “phenomenon of a complex 
disfiguration-refiguration of biblical narrative” (O’Regan 17) that makes Boehme’s work 
a hinge that allows one to think and unthink the concept of God, not merely in traditional 
theology, but also for philosophy. Gnosticism, as a writing, can never become an 
orthodoxy for it eternally writes itself as the Other of orthodox Christianity; it always 
threatens traditional theology due to its belief in, to quote Georges Bataille, 
matter as an active principle having its own eternal autonomous existence as 
darkness (which would not be simply the absence of light, but the monstrous 
archontes revealed by this absence), and as evil (which would not be the absence 
of good, but a creative action). This conception was perfectly incompatible with 
the very principle of the profoundly Hellenistic spirit, whose dominant tendency 
saw matter and evil as degradations of superior principles. Attributing the creation 
of the earth, where our repugnant and derisory agitation takes place, to a horrible 
and perfectly illegitimate principle evidently implies, from the point of view of 
the Greek intellectual construction, a nauseating, inadmissible pessimism, the 
exact opposite of what had to be established at all costs and made universally 
manifest. In fact the opposed existence of an excellent divinity, worthy of the 
absolute confidence of the human spirit, matters little if the baneful and odious 
divinity of this dualism is under no circumstances reducible to it, without any 
possibility of hope. (Bataille “Base Materialism and Gnosticism” 47) 
 
Yet, insofar as Boehme shares traditional theology’s anxiety over the unruliness of the 
figures of darkness and evil that are introduced into his system, he remains committed to 
a theological writing that does not fully disfigure the God which he writes. However, it is 
by means of Boehme’s instrumentalization of the figures of darkness and evil in the 
service of the unquestionable authority of the good and God that his writing opens up for 
us a reading that shows that they are in fact capable of questioning that authority, “since,” 
to quote Bataille, “it does not appear that [the non-ground] has deeply desired the 
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submission of things that belong to a higher authority, to an authority the archontes [of 
discordant existence] stun with an eternal bestiality” (Bataille 48-49). 
3. 3 Discordance and the Disfigured God  
 
Therefore, let us turn to the way that Boehme writes out his metaleptical 
refiguration of God in the Mysterium Pansophicum Or Thorough Report on the Earthly 
and Heavenly Mysterium (1620). Like Schelling after him, Boehme writes of two beings–
God and nature–that take residence “in one united, eternal, and unfathomable original 
condition” (Boehme Mysterium 88). Nature, before it enters into relation with God, is the 
“non-ground” which “is an eternal nothing but forms an eternal beginning as a craving” 
(Boehme Mysterium 85). Nature, as a craving and a nothing, cannot produce anything 
from out of itself. Therefore, Boehme opposes to nature the will, since the nothingness of 
nature “makes the will into something for itself” (Boehme Mysterium 85), and in return, 
the “will rules over the craving” (Boehme Mysterium 86). As it is for Schelling, the 
ground of craving, in spite of its possession of a “life” as well as its ability to incite “an 
arousal of attraction or desire” (Boehme Mysterium 86), is written as something 
insubstantial and dying; without the spirit of the will, without God, the non-ground is 
merely a nothing that “has also has no place where it could find rest” (Boehme 
Mysterium 85). This negative characterization of the non-ground is what opens up the 
space for Boehme to inscribe knowledge into the essence of God, writing “the spirit of 
the will is an eternal knowledge of the non-ground, and the life of the craving an eternal 
being of the will” (Boehme Mysterium 87). Nature’s subservient life, then, pathetically 
exists in order to inspire the desire of the spirit to take on its identity. This erotic 
relationship between nature and spirit is what initiates the search for God’s 
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understanding, setting in motion, in a figure that Schelling will later adopt from Boehme, 
the dialectical movement metaphorically described as “a round sphere-wheel that moves 
on all sides as the wheel in Ezekiel indicates” (Boehme Mysterium 89).  
Yet it is not until spirit and nature enter into their separate lives, the life of nature 
“toward the fire” and that of spirit “toward the light of gloria and magnificence” 
(Boehme Mysterium 89), that Boehme’s writing starts to set up barriers to protect spirit 
from nature, which, at the same time, forecloses the cruelty of–in an almost Artaudian 
sense–Gnostic writing in its exploitation of the ground’s life. For instance, Boehme 
writes that the craving nature “finds that it [itself] is not part of its [own] life,” and, as a 
result, turns in upon itself in revulsion towards its alienated and divided self. In this 
sense, nature is that which must undergo a life of self-revulsion so that the life of the 
spirit can evade the turba (disruption or discordance) of the life of nature and those 
beings and creatures within it. Yet, if the turba is also the fertile “imagination of the 
eternal nature,” it is also what allows nature to give birth to the “creation of the world,” 
making it a productive process despite its violent mode of being. Boehme’s writing 
protects spirit and knowledge from the cruelty of existence, since “violence was not 
called for,” writes Boehme, “or ordered by the highest good” (Boehme Mysterium 91). 
However, spirit cannot completely wash its hands of being’s bloody “monarchia” or 
“empire.” God must stand witness to the discordance of nature’s life because he was “the 
first revealer,” and, although he “did not command malice into the regime” (Boehme 
Mysterium 92), he is still as such to blame for setting this violent wheel in motion. God is 
not exempt from this horror for he is also in the ground, as Boehme writes, 
the essence of the Deity is everywhere in the deep of the unground, like as a 
wheel or an eye, where the beginning has always the end…. For it is an eye in 
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itself, as Ezekiel the prophet saw this in a figure at the introduction of the spirit of 
his will into God, when his spiritual figure was introduced into the wisdom of 
God by the Spirit of God, where he attained vision. (Sex Puncta Theosophica qd. 
in O’Regan 106) 
 
Boehme’s writing of the “evil, poisonous, and furious mysterium” of nature 
represents nature as hermetically sealed off from spirit, concealing God’s ruthless 
exploitation of the turba so that God may see himself as distinct from the fiery image of 
nature. Boehme’s writing refuses to allow the darkness to simply be dark and 
subordinates desire to understanding, darkness to light, evil to good, because evil is said 
to loathe its existence,“desir[ing] a purity” (Boehme Mysterium 91) outside the life of the 
turba.  
God’s subordination of nature takes on new and more deranged dimensions as 
Boehme writes that the non-ground of God is actually the mother of will–something 
Schelling will also adopt in the Freedom essay and the Ages–“for the will finds its mother 
as its craving”; and yet Boehme also writes that “the will is the master in the mother, and 
the mother is recognized as silent and the will as a life without origin” (Boehme 
Mysterium 86). How is it that the will can be a master of its mother if the mother is what 
gives birth to the will? Regardless of the impossibility of this genealogical reversal, the 
will abuses the privilege of its purity by eternally subordinating nature, its mother, so as 
to bring about the fulfillment of its essence, demonstrating the violence that arises from 
the will’s arbitrary rule. God is an omnipresence whose sight is not limited to before or 
after its birth, whose power to be pregnant with itself and the vision of itself illustrates 
the anxiety Boehme’s writing experiences as a result of the darkness it writes into its 
whole. In the same way that God divests the non-ground of its creative capacity by 
subordinating it to himself, Boehme’s Gnostic writing, in its repression of the dark 
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origins of imagination and creation, also fears the diversity and multiplicity it introduces 
through its own creative and heretical figure of the non-ground, fearing itself for the same 
reasons as its orthodox critics. Boehme’s writing reveals that it is itself split, inscribing 
into each text orthodox writing’s repression of Gnosticism in the figure of God, while 
simultaneously giving voice to Gnosticism’s rejection of its subordinate position to 
orthodoxy in the figure of the non-ground. This allows us to read Boehme, then, not as a 
visionary mystic but as an influential hinge figure whose work is pregnant with an 
intellectual ferment, containing within itself a writing that is in conflict with its own 
direction, revealing and writing two allegiances: one to the madness of nature and the 
other to the reason of God. This writing that is not self-same and constantly represses the 
wellspring of its own creative process will erupt in Schelling’s Ages of the World, 
breaking open the barriers which protected God from the discordance of his nature in 
Boehme, and disclosing the deconstructive potential that had always been inherent within 
Gnosticism itself. 
When we turn to Schelling’s The Ages of the World, Boehme’s influence on 
Schelling becomes much more evident insofar as Schelling begins his narration of the 
past by figuring the first nature, like Boehme’s non-ground, as “an unremitting wheel, a 
rotatory movement that never comes to a stand-still and in which there is no 
differentiation,” wherein “the concept of the beginning, as well as the concept of the end, 
again sublimates itself in this circulation” (Schelling Ages 20). The first nature circulates 
in this infinite movement during a primordial time before time as we know it, for nature, 
Schelling writes, “is an abyss of the past” (Schelling Ages 31). Comprised of three 
equipollent figures that each have the right to be for themselves, the first nature remains 
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caught in what Schelling calls an unremitting “self-laceration,” because none of these 
figures are able to rise above the other “since each also has fully the same claim to be the 
being, to be that which has being” (Schelling Ages 11). This equipollence condemns 
these figures to suffer their interdependence as a negating, affirming, and unifying 
potency within the dialectical movement of the first nature. Boehme’s influence on 
Schelling becomes even more obvious, then, through Schelling’s first nature in the way 
that he represents it as  
[t]he antithesis [that] eternally produces itself, in order always again to be 
consumed by the unity . . . [so that] the antithesis is eternally consumed by the 
unity in order always to revive itself anew. This is the sanctuary… the hearth of 
life that continually incinerates itself and again rejuvenates itself from the ash. 
This is the tireless fire through whose quenching, as Heraclitus claimed, the 
cosmos was created . . . . This is the object of the ancient Magi teachings and of 
that doctrine of fire as a consequence of which the Jewish lawgiver left behind to 
his people: “The Lord your God is a devouring fire,” that is, not in God’s inner 
and authentic being [Wesen], but certainly in accordance with God’s nature. 
(Schelling Ages 20-21) 
 
As the above makes clear, the unremitting wheel of the first nature is described in the 
same terms as Boehme’s non-ground, as Schelling thinks it in terms of a “wheel,” “fire,” 
“nature,” and especially as a “magic,” a metaphor Boehme repeatedly resorts to in his 
writings. Schelling’s writing would therefore seem almost indistinct from Boehme’s, as 
he represents the first nature in this way in order to subordinate it to God so that it can act 
as the medium by which God can enter into Being. “God,” writes Schelling once again 
echoing Boehme, “cannot anywhere in itself be that which has being or becomes (in an 
eternal way),” for it “can do so only relationally with respect to an Other” (Schelling 
Ages 40). Schelling, therefore, repeats Boehme’s writing of the real as that which must 
sacrifice itself in service of the ideal’s demands.  
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And yet, Schelling distinguishes himself from Boehme in the way that he writes 
the first nature in its original condition, that is, before it enters into relation with God. 
Whereas Boehme wrote that nature was creative only after its encounter with the spirit 
and was nothing before this relation, Schelling essentializes contradiction into the being 
of the first nature in an eternal way, for “[w]ere the first nature in harmony with itself,” 
writes Schelling, “it would remain so. It would be constantly One and would never 
become Two” (Schelling Ages 12). Since the being of nature is somehow inseparable 
from contradiction, God must be that which does not have being but also as what must 
have being; God, then, in order to become a God that “acts” (Schelling Ages 26) and yet 
remain separate from being, must make nature his “eternal past” so that it “must also be 
dealt with as the first and actual precedent of God” (Schelling Ages 39). Nature, then, 
takes on an unprethinkable but necessary position that precedes the “actual, living God,” 
and consequently interrupts Schelling’s writing of the Triune Godhdead as eternally 
consisting of the figures of necessity, freedom, and finally as the unity of both insofar as 
it is beyond necessity and freedom as the “eternal freedom, pure conation itself” 
(Schelling Ages 27). How is it, then, that Schelling’s writing of the Godhead, another 
Boehmian term, must eternally contain the principles of nature and the conscious God 
within itself, if nature is the eternal past of God which he must pass through in order to be 
fully conscious of himself? 
In order for Schelling to resolve this paradox that positions nature’s existence 
before God’s, he continues to make use of Boehme’s narrative, which writes the first 
nature as a being that wishes to subordinate itself to the authority and eternal freedom of 
God, since “in that eternally commencing life [of the first nature] there lies the wish to 
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escape from the involuntary movement and from the distress of pining” (Schelling Ages 
27). However, Schelling cannot write out the first nature’s surrender to eternal freedom 
with the same religious abandon as Boehme. Instead, he writes about “that moment in 
which the earthly and the heavenly first divided,” not in terms of a theological or tragic 
split, but in terms of a crisis that, in the words of Tilottama Rajan, “may not be resolved 
so much as opened up” (Rajan “Abyss” 20). Because, notes Rajan, the highest potency of 
the first nature pushes the lowest down in order to enter into relation with the higher 
principle of God, we can then read the opening of the crisis as something that is actually 
brought on by the way Schelling writes the crisis. Rajan continues, 
For in describing the transference of the lower into the higher that constitutes 
guidance, he admits to a “potency [and] potentiality” of the lower that has been 
“excessively weakened and oppressed by the higher principle.” If the higher is 
oppressive, then the higher must itself be part, even a cause, of the crisis. Put 
differently, since each principle has an equal right to be that which has being, any 
principle that constitutes itself as higher so as to limit what Schelling in 1809 had 
called freedom risks being oppressive. But this is, if not to negate, at least to put 
any form of guidance under erasure. (Rajan “Abyss” 20) 
 
Indeed, any guidance that Schelling writes into the Ages is unable successfully to direct 
its narrative, since the Ages as a project which aimed at encapsulating the three ages of 
the world–past, present, and future–was never able to write itself out of the past, 
returning “twelve times” (Rajan Abyss 20) to the writing of the first book. So, “[a]s 
Schelling is swept back to the beginnings,” to quote David Farrell Krell, “to the distant 
elevated past, suffering and fatality become ever more central to his own narrative. It is 
as though the way up were the way down,” (Krell Tragic Absolute 130) though the way 
down, as we have already seen, means returning to the unprethinkability of the eternally 
past, that is, to a beginning that can only be approached from within the order of 
madness. The way that Schelling’s repetition of the beginning mirrors the madness of the 
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unremitting wheel of the first nature discloses to us that this crisis at the origin had been 
inherent yet concealed in Boehme’s mythopoeic narrative all along. Schelling’s 
transposition of the Gnostic narrative of God’s self-revelation into a philosophical writing 
merely brings to light this crisis insofar as the Ages illustrates that the return to the 
beginning of existence reveals an original trauma that cannot be resolved, since it resulted 
from the eternal splitting of knowledge from the madness that is its creative centre. 
3. 4 Sacrifice, Creation, and the Lacerated Nature 
 
This crisis which, Schelling writes, initiates the split between nature and the 
divine thus also opens up a way of reading Schelling alongside Boehme and Bataille, 
insofar as we can read nature as a site of creation as well as a site of madness, and 
therefore, in the words of Bataille, “no longer as a moment of a homogeneous process–of 
a necessary and pitiful process–but as a new laceration within a lacerated nature” 
(Bataille “The Pineal Eye” 80). What Boehme and Schelling demonstrate in their writing 
of the opposition of nature to the divine is what Bataille will later note about the violence 
that is inherent to the dialectical relationship between the real and the ideal. Once the real 
enters into relation with the ideal, argues Bataille, it is immediately subordinate to it and 
tears, mutilates, and sacrifices itself in order to fulfill the ideal’s commands. Madness, 
mutilation, sacrifice, and creation are therefore all intertwined, as the sacrifice or 
mutilation of the body assures the survival of the sacrificer and represents a renewal of 
the creative act of the real. Madness does not write its own history; if it could, it would 
not need the ideal to articulate this self-laceration. This is made clear in how Bataille 
demonstrates that madness can only be written through the language of knowledge, 
science, or medicine. For his account of madness, as his essay “Sacrificial Mutilation” 
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makes clear, comes in the form of a psychological testimony from the clinical journals of 
the Annales medico-psychologiques. 
On the morning of December 11, he [Gaston F] was walking on the Boulevard de 
Ménilmontant, and having arrived at the Père-Lachaise cemetery, he stared at the 
sun, and, receiving from its rays the imperative order to tear off his finger, 
without hesitation, without feeling any pain, he seized between his teeth his left 
index finger, successively broke through the skin, the flexor and extensor tendons, 
and the articular ligaments at the level of the phalangeal articulation; using his 
right hand, he then twisted the extremity of the dilacerated left index finger, 
severing it completely. (Bataille “Sacrificial Mutilation” 61) 
 
The reason for Gaston F.’s mutilation becomes clearer once Batailles relates that he was 
inspired by Van Gogh’s own mutilation of his ear, possibly getting the idea to mutilate 
himself after having read a biography on Van Gogh. But Gaston F’s act cannot merely be 
explained by reading this biography, as Bataille’s reading of this act of auto-mutilation 
points toward the significance of the sun for both Van Gogh and Gaston F as the abstract 
ideal that commands the madness of self-mutilation. The relation between the sun as the 
ideal and the act of self-mutilation as the gory and bestial real is significant, for it was 
only after the episode when Van Gogh sent his ear to a girl in a prostitution house in 
December 1888, as Bataille aptly points out, that the main theme of Van Gogh’s 
paintings became the sun and the sunflower. “This double bond uniting the sun-star,” 
writes Bataille, “the sun-flower, and Van Gogh can… be reduced to a normal 
psychological theme in which the star is opposed to the withered flower, as are the ideal 
term and the real term of the ego” (Bataille “Sacrificial Mutilation” 63). Sacrifice, as 
Bataille notes, is always a creative act, insofar as it represents the real’s “desire to 
resemble perfectly an ideal term” (Bataille “Sacrificial Mutilation” 66) and is, therefore 
not merely an uninterpretable and meaningless act; instead, sacrifice is the act by which 
the general economy between the real and the ideal is recommenced, indeed making 
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madness that figure, in Schelling’s terms, of “the hearth of the life that continually 
incinerates itself and again rejuvenates itself from the ash” (Schelling Ages 20). Without 
the real, the ideal will remain unwritten, and, as Derrida notes, “through a single act, [a 
decision] links and separates reason and madness . . . as the original act of an order, a fiat, 
a decree, and as a schism, a casesura, a separation, a dissection” (Derrida “Cogito” 38). 
As we return from Bataille back towards Boehme and Schelling, self-mutilation 
must be added to the list of qualities of creation and madness that characterize the writing 
of nature. While Boehme writes a hermetical seal around nature and protects spirit from 
the pain of existence, Schelling writes a God that “leads human nature down no other 
path than that down which God Himself must pass. Participating in everything blind, 
dark, and suffering of God’s nature is necessary in order to elevate God to the highest 
consciousness” (Schelling Ages 101). To be, for man and God alike, is thus to suffer in 
conflict and contradiction. Yet, it is not the external conflict between God and nature that 
gives consciousness its character, because, in a proto-typically psychoanalytic turn, 
Schelling writes, only nature as “the blind force is capable of inspiration. All conscious 
creation presupposes an unconscious creating. Conscious creating is just the unfolding 
and setting into opposition of unconscious creating” (Schelling Ages 102). If conscious 
creating must have recourse to a constant solicitation of madness as the reserve of 
consciousness’s creative acts, Schelling’s writing of madness shows that it has its own 
reserve in the form of a base materialism that threatens the economy of exchange 
between the ideal and the real. In one of his most metaphorical passages, Schelling writes 
of this inborn potential of an ancient discord lying at the bottom of nature: 
The ancients did not speak in vain of a divine and holy madness. We even see 
nature, in the process of its free unfolding, becoming, in proportion to its 
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approach to spirit, ever more, so to speak, frenzied…. Panthers or tigers do not 
pull the carriage of Dionysus in vain. For this wild frenzy of inspiration in which 
nature found itself when it was in view of the being was celebrated in the nature 
worship of prescient ancient peoples by the drunken festivals of Bacchic orgies. 
Furthermore, that inner self-laceration of nature, that wheel of initial birth 
spinning about itself as if mad, and the terrible forces of the annular drive 
operating within this wheel, are depicted in other frightful splendors of the 
primeval customs of polytheistic worship by acts of self-flaying rage. One such 
act was auto-castration (which was done in order to express either the unbearable 
quality of the oppressive force or its cessation as a procreative potency). 
(Schelling Ages 102-103) 
 
This passage echoes another passage from Schelling’s Freedom essay, wherein Schelling 
compares the loss of balance and control to the generation of things in nature as “a bleak 
and wild enthusiasm that breaks out into self-mutilation or, like the priests of the 
Phrygian goddess, self-castration which is achieved in philosophy through the 
renunciation of reason and science” (Schelling Freedom 26). However, Schelling’s tone 
in the Ages changes dramatically from the Freedom essay, as Schelling writes the 
relationship between madness, mutilation, and the ceremonies of inspiration as necessary 
to the life of the Gods: “panthers or tigers do not pull the carriage of Dionysus in vain.” 
Schelling connects the third act, which returns to the Freedom essay’s anxiety over its 
inability to control its own narrative, of auto-castration, which can be read in one of two 
ways: as a performance expressing the unbearable quality of nature’s “oppression,” or a 
cessation of this higher oppression’s procreative potential in favor of a dark, bestial, and 
base cessation of procreation. In the restricted economy between the real and the ideal, 
the orgiastic festivals carry on as rituals that guarantee the return of the Gods, 
characterizing the eternal beginning of this economy as representative of Schelling’s 
infinite writing of the creation of nature in the First Outline. On the other hand, auto-
castration may also bring about the cessation of this eternally recommencing relation of 
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the real to the ideal in the removal of nature’s procreative organs. Who is to say, then, 
that nature’s madness is held in reserve for the creation of God’s consciousness, if, as 
Schelling writes, these festivals may also end with “the carrying about of the 
dismembered parts of a lacerated God” (Schelling Ages 103)? 
Taken this way, Schelling’s revelation–which remains simultaneously the 
revelation that he inherited from Boehme, Christianity, and Gnosticism–brings about its 
own metaleptical disfiguration-refiguration of the heretical nature of Gnostic narrative. 
Schelling’s disfiguration, in its tone and through the wide-ranging allusions to 
philosophy, mysticism, theology, biblical exegesis, and science is perhaps so violent that 
the redemptive and loving character ascribed to God becomes forever disfigured by the 
base materialism of madness, which could at any moment dissolve the dialectical relation 
between the real and the ideal, sending everything back into nothingness. It is in the 
subtleties of Schelling’s text and not in any explicit articulation that we are able to see 
that Schelling’s text contains within itself the awareness of the absolute contingency of 
its existence. Although Boehme and Schelling ask how something can come from 
nothing, it cannot avoid the horrifying realization that arises from asking this question 
from the progression of its narrative, that is, the realization that there is always the 
possibility that there could have been nothing.  
Boehme never seems to realize that existence is not guaranteed, whereas 
Schelling in some passages seems to insist that the other possibility would be in fact 
psychologically indigestible, declaring “uncontainment is everywhere also imperfection” 
and only “[c]ontainment is the real consummation of every work” (Schelling Ages 93). 
Schelling’s Ages, though, is uncontainable as it suffers from its auto-immunity, for every 
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form of guidance that he constructs to try to contain the impossible excessiveness of this 
narrative of God’s self-revelation is merely a barrier to conceal the fear and dread that is 
inherent to the abyssal nature of Schelling’s writing. As madness is at once the hearth of 
life and the unremitting wheel that miserably rotates and produces itself, it does so not 
merely because it is subordinate to the life of the ideal; in the way that Schelling writes 
this “life of loathing and anxiety” (Schelling Ages 46), we see that its anxiety comes not 
only from above, but also from below, from the abyss that threatens to engulf the first 
nature’s activity at any second. The madness of the incessant movement of the first 
nature shows an awareness of the absolute contingency of its existence; because it is 
terrified of being thrown back at any moment into non-existence, it eternally sacrifices 
itself, pulling the carriage of God towards a point that is infinitely and eternally out of 
reach. In this sense, if Schelling inherits a writing that is influenced by or comes from 
Boehme’s Gnosticism, it also shows that Schelling’s Gnosticism is truly the heretical 
other of orthodox Christianity, since its writing eternally narrates the history of its 
knowledge as well as the history of its madness. 
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Writing, Repression, and the Impossibility of Forgetting 
4. 1 Introduction 	  
 Up until now, this thesis has read Schelling’s texts ‘otherwise,’ in the words of 
Nancy, by finding points in the First Outline, the Freedom essay, and The Ages of the 
World that open up these texts to their own deconstruction. Each text we have read is 
never complete, and, as such, none of them amount to a dead thing, but rather are 
somewhere in between fixed and evolving. Each text legitimates itself in the process of 
its own work, in the sense that each is in the process of writing its own mythology, as 
“[m]ythology,” as Nancy quotes Schelling’s later Philosophy of Revelation, “is therefore 
figuration proper” (Nancy The Inoperative Community 54). The writing of Schelling’s 
texts has revealed to us that each text has failed to conceive of one systematic philosophy, 
not because of an inadequacy on the part of Schelling, but precisely because the essence 
of writing itself is doomed to fail the demands of idealism. Schelling’s failure is not truly 
a failure nor is it truly a success; “failure does not put an end to writing” (Blanchot “From 
Dread”14). Schelling’s writing is above all an honest writing in the sense developed by 
Blanchot, for he has not imposed upon it a law that it should follow and has always 
allowed his writing to be when he could very well have stopped writing and therefore 
ceased to be a writer.  
But in the context of the works that we have read, The Ages of The World makes 
available to us as readers a writing that is unlike the other works we have seen. While its 
system is similar to the one Schelling writes in the Freedom essay, insofar as it shares 
much of the same terminology, and focuses on the writing of the self-revelation of God, 
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the narrative structure that allows the Freedom essay to be read in a linear and 
straightforward manner has been disfigured and unravelled in the Ages. The project of 
The Ages of the World is also different because it went unpublished during Schelling’s 
lifetime. It remained hidden from the public; it was a draft in the truest sense of the word 
as that which was never meant for the public eye. Schelling, whose writing had always 
been so daring and speculative, and who was criticized by Hegel precisely for “work[ing] 
out his philosophy in view of the public” (Hegel 513), had suddenly become incapable of 
presenting any of the extant versions he had written. While the third chapter showed one 
way of reading the Ages otherwise by reading it as Schelling’s writing of heresy rather 
than his quiet abandonment to theology, this final chapter seeks to show the Ages as a 
text that most properly gives itself over to the cruelty of a reading that reveals the 
nothingness behind writing, the dread of the writer, and the abyss of language. Focusing 
once again on the 1815 version of The Ages of the World, I argue that the Ages can be 
read as a reflection on writing itself as it puts into question the very act of writing, insofar 
as the Ages asks what makes writing possible in the first place. The figure of the Godhead 
reflects the nothingness of the writer and shows a radical questioning of the idea of 
writing, since the Godhead, the writer, and writing as arche-writing, it will be argued, can 
be read as the transcendental signifiers of the text. In this sense, Schelling’s figure of the 
Godhead, like Derrida’s conception of différance, opens up a deconstructive reading of 
the text. Rather than grounding the text, the Godhead exposes the text to the crisis of its 
writing that results from the radical contingency of its abyssal origin. 
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4. 2 From Philosophy to Literature 	  
The Ages, in this sense, becomes no longer merely a philosophical work, for it has 
discovered the very essence of its being literature! It is literature in the deconstructive 
sense, as expressed by Blanchot in “Literature And the Right to Death:” “literature begins 
at the moment when literature becomes a question” (Blanchot “Literature” 21). Further, 
the Ages can be read as literature, to quote from Michel Foucault, since  
there is nothing for it do but to curve back in a perpetual return upon itself, as if 
its discourse could have no other content than the expression of its own form; it 
addresses itself to itself as a writing subjectivity, or seeks to re-apprehend the 
essence of all literature in the movement that brought it into being; and thus all its 
threads converge upon the finest of points – singular, instantaneous, and yet 
absolutely universal – upon the simple act of writing. (Foucault 300) 
 
However, this discovery, I will argue, also necessitated of Schelling the act of a 
repression in his subsequent work. The Ages did not merely represent the failure to write 
the manifestation of God, for, within the context of Schelling’s body of work, it also 
represented the abyssal element of nothingness that traumatizes the act of writing itself, 
representing the necessity that makes writing possible and the necessity of the 
impossiblity of writing.  
Because writing, here, is in a sense always a writing about itself in a perpetual 
return upon itself, we can read Schelling’s Godhead as the figure, to quote Jacques 
Derrida, of “arche-writing” insofar as arche-writing opens up the possibility for the 
activity of writing. In the same way that the Godhead brings about the conscious God and 
the first nature in an unprethinkable and impossible decision, so too does it function as 
arche-writing functions, as the idea that allows for a writing of difference to be. Arche-
writing, according to Derrida, is that which eludes the “vulgar concept of writing”; it is a 
“movement of difference, irreducible arche-synthesis, opening in one and the same 
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possibility, temporalization as well as relationship with the other and language” that is at 
once “the condition of all linguistic systems,” and yet it cannot “form a part of the 
linguistic system itself and be situated as an object in its field” (Derrida Of 
Grammatology 60). Whereas many readings of the Ages point to the ungrounding and 
deconstructive quality of the first nature, the first nature is, in a sense, the Ungrund of the 
text insofar as it functions as an ungrounding principle within the economy of the text. 
Despite the first nature being the site of creation, it thus requires the Godhead as the 
original beginning that cannot be economized, as something beyond and above it, as what 
is absolute and pre-figures both the first nature and the actual God. Consequently, the 
first nature, though it ungrounds itself as it ungrounds God’s authority over it, remains 
mutually dependent on the figure of God and “is [therefore] more written than said, it is 
economized” (Derrida “Cogito” 62).  
In contrast to the unconditioned Nature Schelling writes of in the First Outline as 
Being itself, the Godhead is constructed as the synthetic point that precedes and “is 
exclusively above all Being” (Schelling Ages 23), since “it cannot be that which has 
being [seyend seyn] with regard to itself” (Schelling Ages 6). The Godhead, a term 
borrowed once again from Jacob Boehme, is a nothingness, what Derrida calls the 
originary trace that is dislocated from “the appearance and functioning of [the] 
difference” that actually arises in the opposition of God with nature, and therefore is “an 
originary synthesis not preceded by any absolute simplicity” (Derrida Of Grammatology 
62). The Godhead, the first nature, and God as figures of the eternal “past beginning in 
dark night” (Schelling Ages 3), allow Schelling to write speculatively of these not as they 
actually appear in time, but as they relate to each other in an eternal way abstracted from 
	  	  
98 
historical time in the book of the eternal past. While they remain suspended in the 
eternity that precedes time, Schelling discursively conflates the Godhead with the duality 
that will arise after the crisis that brings about existence, so that God is at once the 
Godhead, the Godhead is at once God, and what “is necessary in God [is called] the 
nature of God” (Schelling Ages 5). He does this using a logical explanation, positing 
[o]nly an identity of the being, of the link (of the copula). The true meaning of 
every judgment, for instance, A is B, can only be this: that which is A is that 
which is B, or that which is A and that which is B are one and the same. . . . the “x 
that is A” and “the x that is B” is one and the same, that is the, the same x. There 
are actually three propositions contained in the above cited proposition. The first, 
“A=x,” the second, “B=x,” and, following from this, the third, “A and B are one 
and the same,” that is, “both are x.” (Schelling Ages 8) 
 
And yet, during this primordial time, the Triune Godhead is more precisely 
nothing since it has not distinguished anything in itself. In the same way Blanchot says 
that “before his work exists,” the writer “not only does . . . not know who he is, but he is 
nothing. He only exists as a function of the work . . . . it has value, truth and reality only 
through the words which unfold it in time and inscribe it in space” (Blanchot “Literature” 
24). The Godhead, as the original beginning (Urgrund) of the Ages, is therefore never 
fully something that exists, but can only be articulated in between the two figures of God 
and the first nature, as an abyss that gives birth, that acts, envelopes, and imperceptibly 
embodies and yet withdraws from difference. The only apparent distinction that can be 
said of the Godhead in this primordial time is that it is “the Supreme Being” which “for 
itself is groundless and borne by nothing,” and is furthermore “in itself the antithesis of 
personality” (Schelling Ages 6). Schelling does not define what the Godhead’s place or 
movement within the text is, because the Godhead functions as a juncture of strategic 
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ambiguity that opens up the articulation or the construction of the Triune nature of 
necessity, freedom, and the unity contained within the Godhead’s eternal freedom.   
 If, as Schelling writes, “[everyone] agrees that the Godhead is the Supreme 
Being, the purest Love, infinite communicativity and emanation” (Schelling Ages 5), yet 
if it is also at the same time an indifference, or the unconditioned, a problem arises in 
attributing to the Godhead these seemingly contradictory affects. In truth, from where 
does this concept of Godhead as pure love, communicativity and emanation originate? 
Interestingly, there is evidence to support that Schelling may have in fact stumbled upon 
the concept of the Godhead at the end of the Freedom essay, and it is there that we see 
the beginning of this problem of attributing conditions to the unconditioned. Having 
reached the end of the investigation in the Freedom essay, Schelling writes of a “being 
before all ground and before all that exists, thus generally before any duality,” what he 
calls “the original ground or the non-ground [Ungrund]” (Schelling Freedom 68). This 
original ground–or non-ground, maintaining the concept’s essential ambiguity even in the 
Freedom essay–is described as “the absolute indifference [Indifferenz]” of duality, and is 
described not in terms of being a product of opposites but rather “is its own being 
separate from all opposition, a being against which all opposites ruin themselves, that is 
nothing else than their very not-Being [Nichtsein]” (Schelling Freedom 68-69). The 
origin of the original ground remains mysterious to readers, since its description comes 
rather late in the exposition of the Freedom essay’s argument; however, what becomes 
evident to readers of the 1815 version of the Ages is the similarity between the non-
ground and the Godhead as the unity as well as the figure which “instead of abolishing 
the distinction [of duality] . . . rather posits and confirms it” (Schelling Freedom 69).  
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 And yet Schelling in the Ages makes the Godhead the origin as well as the 
highest figure of God’s self-revelation, whereas the non-ground’s appearance in the 
Freedom essay is motivated more by Schelling’s desire to close off the narrative than 
anything else. Turning to it only at the end of the text as a rhetorical coup de grâce that 
eliminates the anarchy of the eternal ground (Schelling Freedom 70), Schelling 
transforms the non-ground from its original articulation into the highest expression of 
love in order to discursively legitimate the text’s theodicean rhetoric. Schelling writes, 
this is the secret of love, that it links such things of which each could exist for 
itself, yet does not and cannot exist without the other. For this reason as duality 
comes to be in the non-ground, love comes to be as well, linking that which exists 
(that which is ideal) with the ground for existence. . . . Then everything is 
subordinate to spirit. . . . [But above] spirit, however, is the initial non-ground that 
is no longer indifference (neutrality) and yet not the identity of both principles, 
but rather a general unity that is the same for all and yet gripped by nothing that is 
free from all and yet a beneficence acting in all, in a word, love, which is all in all. 
(Schelling Freedom 70) 
 
In this sense, the non-ground prefigures the Godhead and takes on the function of 
Derrida’s pure trace, since “[i]t is not the question of a constituted difference . . . but 
rather, [is] before all determination of the content, of the pure movement which produces 
difference. The (pure) trace is différance” (Derrida Of Grammatology 62). However, in 
the Freedom essay, Schelling instrumentalizes the non-ground by turning it into the 
culminating point of history; to quote from Blanchot, it therefore “freezes in the form of 
an artifice whose exterior complexity is constantly being reduced by the intention that has 
brought it into being” (Blanchot “From Dread” 12). This false unity is therefore a 
repression of its antithesis in bad faith, since the non-ground, as a being that is above God 
and eternally prior to it, is meant to ground the personality of God and bring about the 
duality of his existence. The artificiality of its expression becomes more evident, since it 
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comes at the end of the text rather than at the beginning, insofar as the introduction of the 
non-ground in fact disfigures the narrative of freedom and personality that came before it, 
and therefore negates what it was meant to organize. As Schelling states, 
the whole is distorted, and it also follows then that this system abolishes the 
personality of the highest being. We have been hitherto silent about this 
frequently heard accusation as about many others, but believe that we have 
established the first clear concept of personality in this treatise. In the non-ground 
or indifference there is admittedly no personality. But is the beginning point really 
the whole? (Schelling Freedom 73) 
 
Schelling’s question to the reader as to whether the beginning is really commensurate 
with the whole is a question which he cannot answer himself. If the non-ground disrupts 
the end by opening up new problems for Schelling while it tries to close off others, it is 
for this reason that Schelling transposes the non-ground into the figure of the Godhead at 
the beginning of the Ages in order to ensure that the beginning point really does amount 
to the whole which it produces.   
 In between the writing of the Freedom essay and the 1815 version of the Ages, 
Schelling loses faith in the redemptive potential of the non-ground. Instead, he effects a 
necessary “distancing” or repression of the beginning, excluding this beginning from the 
one in which God is eternally caught. This exclusion prefigures the articulation of 
primary repression in psychoanalysis, not in the sense developed by Freud, but more 
appropriately that developed by Lacan. For Lacan, primary repression is not a psychical 
act, but “a structural feature of language itself – namely, its necessary incompleteness, the 
impossibility of ever saying ‘the truth about the truth’ (Ec, 868)” (Evans 165). For 
“God,” writes Schelling, “has no beginning insofar as it has no beginning of its 
beginning. The beginning in it is an eternal beginning, that is, a beginning that was, as 
such, from all eternity and still always is one that never ceases to be a beginning” 
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(Schelling Ages 17). Consequently, if God’s beginning is always alienated from its 
beginning, actual beginning, the inscription of God as the pronouncement of the word, is 
merely one that is in media res, it is “[t]he beginning that a being has outside of itself,” 
writes Schelling, that is opposed to “the beginning that a being has within itself. . . . A 
beginning from which it can be alienated and from which it can distance itself is different 
than a beginning in which it eternally remains” (Schelling Ages 17). It is here that we 
begin to see a difference between the Godhead and the difference which precipitates from 
the emergence of the actual God and the first nature. God is eternally beginning, which 
echoes the Freedom essay’s formulation of the non-ground’s division “into two equally 
eternal beginnings” (Schelling Freedom 70); but in 1815 Schelling articulates two 
beginnings, one that is appropriate to God, and one that a being has outside of itself and 
which it must exclude from itself in order to be. If we were to conceive this alienated 
beginning to be the beginning of the Godhead, how is it that we would be able to 
represent this transcendental origin of the actual God as a beginning that is itself, as 
God’s eternal freedom, the condition for eternity and yet outside of eternity? If the 
beginning in which God finds himself necessitates a primary repression which excludes 
the alienated beginning, has God found himself in a space of representation out of which 
he can never escape and to which he is irrevocably exposed, or, quoting Blanchot, has the 
Godhead entered “into the workings of a vital contingency which he cannot control or 
even observe” (Blanchot “Literature” 28)? God is thus exposed to the radical contingency 
of his own revelation, since he is excluded from his writing of history in the same way as 
“the origin,” as Jason Wirth puts it, or “the author of philosophy cannot become an object 
of philosophy” (Wirth Ages xv). The decision for God had always already been, since the 
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moment God exists is the decision for existence, the decision of eternal freedom and of 
the Godhead; but since the decision does not know itself as a decision, it is not necessary 
but is radically free in its originary implausibility. Because the Godhead does not decide 
anything for itself, it is rather an unprethinkable and impossible decision for God as it is 
for writing, because it is, to quote from Nancy, “the decision for philosophy, the decision 
that delivers and will deliver philosophy to its destiny” (Nancy The Experience of 
Freedom 7). 
 While Schelling may write “that unity in duality and duality in unity . . . is what 
is essential in divine individuality” (Schelling Ages 51), this ambiguity is Schelling’s 
attempt at merging the emergence of God with the figure of the Godhead, writing two 
names for God in order to write over the abyss that separates the alienated beginning of 
the Godhead with God’s eternally beginning life. As the Godhead is the antithesis of 
personality, personality, writes Schelling, “is the principle by dint of which God is He 
Himself as He Himself” and is the “ultimate act or the ultimate potency by which an 
intelligent being exists in an incommunicable fashion” (Schelling Ages 107). God is 
destined to be as the higher that draws out the lower, but in order to be that personality 
that writes itself into nature, God must in a certain sense be outside of itself, and is thus 
never connected to the force, the proper name, the transcendental signifier that is 
simultaneously the condition of its existence as what puts its indelible personality at risk 
of erasure. Elohim, writes Schelling, is the name “whose true pronunciation is unknown,” 
and is the expression of the Godhead as “pure breath, pure spirit” (Schelling Ages 52). 
Elohim “occupies,” in the words of Nancy, “with the text, the very place of a name that 
flees and yet returns, finding itself alternately . . . firmly distanced, then evoked in its 
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very distance as the site or as the index of a form of intrigue of the absenting of sense” 
(Nancy Dis-Enclosure 86).  
 Jehovah, on the other hand, is God’s other name as that which is expressed, the 
aspect of God that acts and communicates and answers the world when the world asks 
what is God, as Schelling illustrates in Moses’s conversation with God, for “Jehovah 
answered, “hence, you should say, ‘Jehovah, the Elohim of your fathers, sends me to you. 
That is my name for eternity’” (Schelling Ages 52). Schelling’s meditation on the Old 
Testament’s names for God shows that indeed there is the God of personality but also the 
plurality of names of the “tetragrammaton,” Elohim, the true God, which inscribes a 
nominalization of ambiguity in the connection between Godhead and the God of duality, 
inscribing an absence in the actuality of God that is somehow above and beyond the God 
that is expressed in the world. The question of God’s self-revelation, therefore, must 
always return to this question of the plural Elohim which acts in a “verb in the singular, 
where the meaning, for example, of bara Elohim is, “the one who created is Elohim,” 
(Schelling Ages 52) functioning like Derrida’s pure trace as that which is written as the 
absence of life, not as writing’s solution, and as the origin that cannot explain why 
anything is written. For the Godhead remains above being as an absence, fleeing from the 
order of the world which it creates as the alienated condition that inscribes God into 
existence. In this sense, as Schelling writes in the Philosophical Letters we “cannot get 
rid of the idea of God” (Schelling Letters 158), because God is forever caught in the 
same movement as we are, he is forever an idea as he is forever the word, Jehovah, that 
arises from the transcendental signified of the Godhead that initiates and yet is outside the 
order of language. God is therefore not “in question,” to quote from Nancy, for the “name 
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God must, then, represent something other than a concept here, more precisely, it must 
bear and bring to a head a trait common to names as such: to be at the extremity and the 
extenuation of sense” (Nancy Dis-Enclosure 87).  
4. 3 Philosophy as Auto-Deconstruction or Auto-Biography? 	  
 In this sense, the Ages is a mise en abyme of the writer’s relationship to his or 
her work, and more importantly represents Schelling’s relationship to the Ages itself, for 
once writing begins the writer is forever cut off from the work in the same way as 
Schelling writes that “the Godhead sits enthroned over a world of terrors” (Schelling 
Ages 49). While one could take God to be the subject of its own history in the way 
Schelling writes that one “who could write completely the history of their own life would 
also have, in a small epitome, concurrently grasped the history of the cosmos” (Schelling 
Ages 3), we can read the Ages itself as undertaking this tragic and impossible destiny to 
attempt to achieve self-sameness across the irreducible necessity of its doubling. Taking 
Schelling’s Introduction to the Ages as a serious statement on the narrative quality of 
philosophy, the book of the Past represents a self-reflexive position on the writing of the 
project of the Ages. The eternally ancient knowledge discussed in the introduction 
anticipates the unfolding of this non-coexistent knowledge in the writing of the Ages, not 
as something that can be pointed to in one concept or be contained within a moment, but 
rather as an auto-generative process, a narrative, or a fiction that takes on meaning only 
within the mythology, philosophy’s autopoeisis, which philosophy always finds itself in 
the process of figuring. Schelling already understood that writing is itself subject to this 
same freedom, by the fact that what is known is always “narrated” and that “that 
knowledge [that is narrated] is the simple consequence and development of its own 
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concepts. . . . Its true representation is that it is the development of a living, actual being 
[Wesen] which presents itself in it” (Schelling Ages xxxv). But the living, actual “being,” 
that Schelling writes can be more appropriately translated as “essence,” as even Jason 
Wirth notes. “Das Wesen,” Wirth writes, “presents one of the most difficult translation 
challenges in most any work by Schelling,” for, “Das Wesen is not a present essence, a 
being present in its integrity” (Wirth 136). Instead, essence is that something which 
escapes and makes its presence known through its absence from the process of 
knowledge, of being, of writing, etc. The Ages distinguishes itself from Schelling’s other 
texts since it finally writes of that present/absent essence in its articulation of the 
Godhead, as the God which created the world, but always remains beyond or above it as 
eternal freedom. The Godhead’s eternal freedom is that freedom, in the sense developed 
by Nancy and Bataille, that 
prevents itself from being founded. The existence of God was to be free in the 
sense that the freedom that sustained his existence could not become one of its 
predicates or properties. Theology and philosophy had certainly recognized this 
limit, or this dilemma. Conceived of as freedom’s necessary being, God risked (if 
one did not elaborate subtle ad hoc arguments) ruining both himself and freedom. 
(“Is not freedom the power God lacks, or which he only has verbally, since he 
cannot disobey the command that he is, the command of which he is the 
guarantor?” Georges Bataille, Literature and Evil). The freedom of the gods (if 
one must speak of gods…), like every freedom, makes them susceptible to 
existence or nonexistence (they can die): it is not their attribute, but their destiny. 
(Nancy The Experience of Freedom 12) 
 
The figure of the Godhead may allow Schelling to begin writing, but it is also what 
eludes the bounds and limits of representation as it is itself that boundless freedom that 
submits God–and furthermore the text–to the realization of the absolute horror of its 
contradictory and contingent existence. 
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 In this sense, the tone Schelling adopts to describe the contradiction between 
the negative and affirmative principle in the Ages becomes representative of the trauma 
his own writing undergoes in writing the process of contradiction. Therefore, 
contradiction for Schelling is no longer something merely vital but is tragically absurd, 
cruel, and ultimately “is insufferable to everything and everything that finds itself in it” 
(Schelling Ages 12). This is especially true in Schelling’s expression of the systole and 
diastole that expands and contracts, first as the system’s “living concept,” “the wheel of 
birth,” as its “universal ebb and flow” (Schelling Ages 20-21). In the process of this 
alternatingly expanding and contracting movement that “seeks rest, but does not find it,” 
a nagging anxiety overtakes the contradiction’s “[ever]commencing inefficacy”; although 
the wheel turns, it does not do so because of its own self-confidence, but is “scared and 
fears that it would lose existence and hence, contracts anew” (Schelling Ages 90). The 
ground of all creation, the “beating heart of the Godhead,” the “fountain of eternal life,” 
the first nature which had initially been that boundless and powerful figure of Nature in 
the First Outline, in 1815 comes to express its horror and abjection over the abyss of its 
freedom. Therefore, if the project of The Ages of the World in its first two versions could 
still be rightfully labeled a pursuit of absolute knowledge, as were the projects the System 
of Transcendental Idealism and the Freedom essay, the third version reveals this pursuit 
not only to be interminable and unachievable but a doomed pursuit that is absolutely 
horrifying to the philosopher.  
 As a result of Schelling’s insistence on the potency of contradiction as the 
vitality of philosophy, contradiction arises as the only way of writing, not only 
dialectically, but also narratively. But this process in the Ages from 1815 provides a 
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different sense regarding contradiction from the way contradiction functions in the first 
two versions of the Ages, characterizing it in terms of a dreaded resignation to the horror 
and madness that cannot be redeemed by God, knowledge, or love. Instead, contradiction 
is what dooms the philosopher and the poet to eternally retell the tragedy of the Ages, for, 
in the words of Schelling, 
The contradiction that we have here conceived is the fountain of eternal life. The 
construction of this contradiction is the highest task of science. Hence, the 
objection of the philosopher would start science with a contradiction means just as 
much to the philosopher as it would to remind the tragic poet, after hearing the 
introduction of the work, that, after such a beginning, the work could only come 
to a horrible ending, and to cruel deeds and bloody events. This was precisely the 
poet’s intent when they set out. (Schelling Ages 90) 
 
And it is because there was never a decision to set out otherwise. If every beginning only 
ends in tragedy, if the path that is set before the writer again and again by the eternal 
beginning must be covered in its own blood, only to be again bloodied in yet another ill-
fated attempt, the only question left for us to ask Schelling is, “why?” The right answer 
would appear to be simply, “why not”; however, this answer is too simple, and merely re-
inserts itself into the “cision,” “the doubling of ourselves . . . in which there are two 
beings, a questioning being and an answering being” (Schelling Ages xxxvi). While the 
introduction figures this doubling of the self as a positive dialectical method towards the 
achievement of knowledge, through the writing of the Ages, dialectics becomes 
disfigured, and Schelling ultimately loses faith in dialectics as a viable process that would 
lead to a synthetic end.  Rather, every point in the dialectic becomes yet another instance 
of the “unremitting wheel” upon which all answers and questions ruin themselves.  
Rather, insofar as there should be unity, there should also be antithesis. Or unity 
and antithesis should themselves again be in antithesis. But the antithesis is in and 
for itself no contradiction. It could be no more contradictory that there could be A 
as well as B, than that just as there is unity, there is antithesis. Again, these are, 
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between themselves, equivalent. The antithesis can as little surrender to unity as 
unity can surrender to the antithesis. (Schelling Ages 10) 
 
Whereas dialectics, for Schelling, had been a method of working through the idea of 
progress by means of the dynamism he attributed to nature in the First Outline and the 
Freedom essay, and also as a means to posit a final synthesis somewhere in the future, in 
the Ages, there is no possibility of escaping the past except through something 
unprethinkable and unrepresentable. Therefore, dialectics cannot provide the explanation 
for the emergence of the Godhead into existence as God and the first nature, neither can it 
posit a final unity, for the positing of unity in the Ages is thus nothing else but a 
repression of unity’s antithesis. 
 And if dialectics have failed, the Ages also signals the failure of the 
imagination. For the eternal past is itself something that must be imagined in order for 
Schelling to conceive of the idea of an eternal present, as he writes, “if one cannot 
imagine a present that is not founded on a past, then there can be no eternal present that is 
not based on an eternal past” (Schelling Ages 43). As has been shown above, the eternal 
past was imagined in order to posit a time when the Godhead, as “the purest knowledge” 
that does not yet know itself as such, must posit something as opposed to and outside of 
itself to exit this realm of the eternally past: “Only in relation to something else that is 
Being to it can the highest Being comport itself as what has being and can pure 
knowledge comport itself as what knows and hence, be raised to actus” (Schelling Ages 
44). And yet, the Ages is never able to write itself out of the past, except without the use 
of what Schelling calls “a universal magic” (Schelling Ages 66). Therefore, the 
imagination too must resort to deception and illusions as the means to overcome the 
representation of the eternally past and posit the possibility of entering into the mythical 
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age of the eternally present. As the imagination cannot be the solution to the cruel 
ambiguity of existence, the imagination instead shows itself to be the sleep of reason that 
produces monsters.  
 By the end of the 1815 version of the Ages, Schelling assumes the identity of 
Maurice Blanchot’s writer, who “is called upon by his dread to perform a genuine 
sacrifice of himself . . . . [for he] must be destroyed, in an act that really puts him at 
stake” (Blanchot “From Dread to Language” 7-8). Schelling was in a sense destroyed by 
this text, which is to say that Schelling’s repeated attempts at the text, since each extant 
version is representative of this repeated attempt at beginning, are thus expressions of the 
trauma of Schelling’s writing; it is this traumatic writing that at last takes hold of 
Schelling in the writing of the 1815 version of the text. In a sense, the Ages is 
representative of this repeated trauma as it could be read not only as Schelling’s attempt 
at a magnum opus but also as what put an end to Schelling’s radically speculative style of 
writing that was present in the Ages as well as the Freedom essay. Since the Freedom 
essay was one of Schelling’s last published works that theorizes the narrative of God’s 
self-revelation in this radical re-figuration, the Ages, as the unpublished and unfulfilled 
follow-up to the Freedom essay, puts an end to thinking by means of this genre of the 
writing of an absolute and living pantheism. The Ages discloses, therefore, that its 
writing, Schelling’s writing, is itself traumatized in the same way that the first nature is 
traumatized by the process of its creation in the “violent revulsion” (Schelling Ages 91) 
of its miserable existence. Since, “as an old book says, all deeds under the sun are full of 
trouble and everything languishes in toil” (Schelling Ages 90), the dread of writing may 
also be hidden away, concealed out of the fear and anxiety it had caused the writer. The 
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dread of writing, in the sense developed by Blanchot, does not negate writing just as the 
Godhead does not negate God or the first nature; it is the feeling that gives itself over to 
the unbearable quality of writing, as the Ages clearly indicates. It must be asked, then, 
was this trauma of writing that emerged from the nothingness of writing not in fact the 
reason for the unpublished nature of Schelling’s The Ages of the World? If it was, perhaps 
this was because Schelling had taken the project of the Freedom essay, that project of 
developing a real and living pantheism as opposed to Spinoza’s mechanistic pantheism, 
and theorized it to its absolute limits in the Ages; in the process the God of pantheism was 
not only exposed to the horrors of the world but also to the arbitrariness and absurdity of 
its own existence. Was it that Schelling, then, realized that this real pantheism, which he 
writes through the Godhead’s unprethinkable decision for existence, could never end “in 
the harmony and wonderfully blessed unity of the cosmos” as he might have believed in 
1809, but that he found “real pantheism to be horrifying” (Schelling Ages 104)? Or is it 
because Schelling does “away with these limits,” that he makes the Godhead into an 
“object . . . no longer representable,” so that, “he himself [has] strayed beyond the limits 
of representation, . . . [and found] himself lost” (Schelling PL 193)?  
 All of these questions can only guess at Schelling’s feelings towards the writing 
of The Ages of the World, but they are, in a certain way, legitimated because Schelling 
never brought the text to publication. And since the text ends by demanding its own 
repression, the writing clamors for its own forgetting and for a negation of its trauma. As 
Schelling writes, “this pantheistic system of primeval times, this primordial state of 
universal unity and universal closure, is precisely what is ever more to be repressed and 
posited as past by the following time” (Schelling Ages 108). And yet, as we know, the 
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writer no longer has control over the text once it has been written, and is forever, like the 
Godhead, cut off from its creation; its only position is to stand witness over the world of 
terrors for which it was the condition. While this reading has indeed been cruel in 
disclosing the repression covering over the Ages, we must do Schelling a final kindness, 
by giving him the last word, giving him a chance to explain why he never published the 
Ages. Although “[h]e can no longer give distinct form to the boundless object[,] [i]t is 
indistinctly present to his mind. Where shall he bind it, where seize it, where [or how 
could he have] put limits to its excessive power” (Schelling PL 193)? 	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